




TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Hew 
5~-~ 
~ +v ~~~~I -
May 3, 1990 
RE: House Habeas Hearing ( ~d---c,, 2- 4 ) 
Virginia Sloan of Kastenmeier's staff called ~M,g&AIJ8a;, 
~ to confirm that the hearing will take place on May 24, 
1990. You should note that this is not a hearing of the 
~ 
House Judiciary Committee. It is a hearing of Rep. Kasten-
meier's Courts, Intellectual Property, and Administration of 
Justice Subcommittee. The hearing will begin at 9:30 a.m . 
Unlike the Senate hearing, where you spoke first as a single 
witness, the House subcommittee wants you to appear as one 
member of a panel, including Judge Roney and perhaps another 
member of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
R.H.P . 
) 
MAJOIUTY MIMIW -WfY Mtt,111111 
JA(l IAOOlt, TtV.I, CIWkMAN 
IIOIUT W. kAtTENMIEllll. WlfCOHtlN 
DON lDWAIIOI, CAl,lfQ_. 
ONI ~UNDREO FIRST CONGRESS 
HAMILTON PIIH. JII .. "tw YOM 
CAlll.01 J. MOO~HIAD, c;A~IJOjUolA 
IIINIIY J. N'IDl, 11.LINOII 
P. JAMIi HNllM.IIINNll. .Ill. WIICONI IN 
l1U lotcCOLlUM. fLOIUOA JOHN CON'l'llll, JII., MICM!OAN 
IIOMANO ~ M.UIOl.l UNfUCltY 
Ml.LIAW J. IIUG/4H. NtW JIW'I' 
MIKI l'l'NM OICI.AIIOMA 
~onBrt.ss of tht tinittd £,tatts 
ttout or Rq,rumtati\lu 
IIO!ICH \IW. OIIIAI, ,aNNl'tl.VA>IIA 
MICWL D1W1Nt, ~10 
WIUIAM I. DANNIMIEYII\ CAulOIUIIA 
MOWl\1111 COIi.i, NORTM CAIIOI.INA PATIIICIA ICHIIOIDIII. COlOMOO 
!MN GLICKMAN. UIII.AI D. ,MNCM 11.AuGNlll. .ia.. WIOl!j lJ. 
1.AMJ.111. IMITII. tlXAI IAIICl'I' f!W<II. ~IAC..UIITTI 
010. W. CIIO«ffl, A. MICHIGAN 
CH.Ul.11 I . ICHUMP, NIW '1'01111 
IMUCI A. MOMIION, CONNICTICUT 
IOW.UO P. fllGIIAN, OIIIO 
LAWlll'NCI J. IMtt,i. h.o,alll. 
MOWAIIO L H~IMII. CAl.!1011/M 
IIIC1I IIOUCHllt VIIIOINIA 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
2138 RAYIUIIN HOUII O,r1c1 BUILDING 
WASHINGTON. 0C 20151 M21 I 
/-
CIIUCI DOUCII.AI. MlW MAMPllll~l 
CMIG T, JAMH, fLOIIIDA 
fOfll CAM,UU., C.w?OIIIIIA 
~IWTY-lll-JUI 
llllhOIUTV-111-'1~ IIARI.IY 0. ITAHIAI, A, WIIT VIIIGIIIIA 
JONN 1'4YNIT, T1XAI 
Ml!.. UW.I, CAl.lnlfltllA 
01011<11 J, tANOWIITlll. IIUIOII 




The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, 
Associate Justice, Retired 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Washington, DC 20543 
Dear Judge Powell: 
MAY 1990 
Jr. 1th~ :z.j 
The Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Admini•tration of Justice ia planning to conduct a legislative 
hearing on the issue ot habeas corpus. The hearing will be held 
at· 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 24, 1990 in room 2226 Rayburn House 
otfic• Building. 
I would like to invite you to appear and testify. Please 
summarize your opening statement so that it does not exceed five 
minutea. Enclosed you will find a notice which sets forth the 
Committee's requirement that prepared statements be filed at least 
48 hours prior to your scheduled appearance. In accordance with 
Committee policy, 50 copies of your statement muat be submitted by 
no later than Tuesday, May 22, 1990. Please forward them to the 
Subcommittee on courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice, 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, 
Washington, o.c. 20515. Due to the large number of Members (15) on 
the Subcommittee, an extra thirty-five statement• would be 
appreciated. 
Please do not hesitate to contact the Committee if you need 
further intormation. 
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The House Committee on the J'udJclaey wm require all witnessea ached• 
u1ed to teatit1 betore it to provide the Committee with a minimum of 60 
copfe.s ot a prepared ,ta.tement and 60 coplea ot a one-pare aummaey at 
Jeut torty~frht houra prior to the 1cheduted appearance of the wftnw. . . . 
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mended that the 1tatement be t1pewritten, ~•paced, or printed, The 
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the witnw deafrea the CommJttee to make available to th• prus, or the 
public, copies of the prepared statement, the witness w111 provide the Com• 
rnittee In advance of the hearin1 with auch additional copfea as may be 
deafrabJe for dlatrlbutfon, A cop)' of a blorraphlcal aketch la required to 
be 1ubrnitted with the wltnesa' statement. 
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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Mr. KASTENMEIER introduced the following bill; which was referred 
to the Committee on 
A BILL 
To amend title 28, United States Code, with respect to habeas 
corpus, and for other purposes. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
2 of the United States of America 1n congress assembled, 
:# 2 
/.·. ·,/ .. •. • ~ : ,, \ ': ;, . .-_. l 
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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
























SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN CAPITAL CASES. 
Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended 
by adding after subsection (f) the following: 
''(g)(l) In the case of an applicant under sentence of 
death, any application for habeas corpus relief under this 
section must be filed in the appropriate district court 
wi t hin one year from the following date, whichever is 
appropriate: 
''<A) The date of denial Qf a writ of certiorari, if 
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the highest court 
of the State on direct appeal from the conviction and 
sentence is timely filed in the Supreme Court. 
••(B) The date of issuance of the mandate of the 
highest court of the State on direct appeal from the 
conviction and sentence, if a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is not filed in the Supreme Court. 
''cc) The date of issuance of the mandate of the 
Supreme Court, if on a petition for a writ of certiorari 
the Supreme court, upon consideration of the case, 






























''(2) The time requirements established by this section 
shall be tolled--
''(A) during any period in which the applicant is not 
represented by counsel as described in section 8 of the 
Habeas corpus Revision Act of 1990: 
''(B) during the period from the date the applicant 
files an application for State postconviction relief 
until final disposition of the application by the State 
appellate courts and the Supreme Court, if all filing 
deadlines are met; 
''(C) during any period authorized by law for the 
filing of any petitions for rehearing and similar 
petitions, if all filing deadlines are met, and 
''(O) during an additional period not to exceed 90 
days, if counsel moves for an extension in the district 
court that would have jurisdiction of a habeas corpus 
application and makes a showing of good cause. 
''<3) The sanction for failure to comply with the time 
requirements established by this section shall be dismissal, 
except that the time requirements shall be waived if--
' ' (A) the applicant presents a colorable claim, not 
previously presented, of factual innocence or 
ineligibility for a capital sentence; or 
''(B) other exceptional circumstances warrant a 
. , , 
waiver • . 
W I • VW W' I ' I V WW- VW l•t l• I · I I --
.... - ...... ····- -- ______ , .. .. -- • •· • 
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1 SEC. 3. STAYS OF EXECUTION IN CAPITAL CASES. 
























(l) by inserting ·• 
paragraph; 
(2) by inserting •• 
and 
, . 
(a) (l) before the first 
(2> ' ' before the second para9raph; 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
••(b) In the case of an individual under sentence of 
death, a warrant or order se t ting an execution date shall be 
stayed upon application to any court that would have 
jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus under this 
chapter, The stay shall be contingent upon reasonable 
diligence by the individual in pursuing relief with respect 
to such sentence and shall expire if--
•• (1} the individual fails to apply for relief under 
this chapter within the time requirements established by 
section 2254(g} ot this titl@; 
''(2) upon completion of district court and court of 
appeals review under section 2254 of this title, the 
application is denied and--
••(A) the time for filing a petition for a writ 
of certiorari expires before a petition is filed; 
••(B) a timely petition for a writ of certiorari 





























'"<C) a timely petition for a writ of certiorari 
is filed and, upon consideration of the case, the 
Supreme Court disposes of it in a manner that leaves 
the capital sentence undi s turbed; or 
··(3) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in 
the presence of counsel qualified under section 2257 of 
this title, and after being advised of the consequences 
of the decision, an individual waives the right to pursue 
• ' # relief under this chapter •• 
SEC. 4. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS IN CAPITAL CASES. 
Section 2244(b) of title 28, United States Code, is 
amended--
'°' II ,, I# 
(1) by inserting (1) after (b) : and 
{2) by adding at the end the following: 
''(2) In the cage of a applicant under sentence of death, 
a second or successive application presenting a claim not 
previously presented by the applicant in an application under 
this chapter shall be dismissed unless--
''(A) the failure to raise the claim previously is--
''(i) the result of interference by State 
officials; 
''(ii) the result of Supreme Court recognition of 
a new Federal right that is retroactively applicable; 
or 
•~; :,:,_·? ... .. •: ... ,~ .. • ••• ·, .... , __ ,1 J;,•~·- _ .-!i&.11-..;.. '• . ...L,-.:, ............. --....r .. .:.... ... - ..... •M .... 4-..... •·- •. \_, "'• . - ~ - - .... .:. • _ _ r_.., 




























''<iii) the r@sult of the discovery of facts that 
could not have been discovered previously by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence; or 
''(B) the facts underlying the claim would be 
sufficient, if proven, to undermine the court's 
confidence in the applicant's guilt of the offense or 
offenses for which the capital sentence was imposed or 
the appropriateness of that sentence; or 
''(C) consideration of the application is necessary 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, 
• • (3) In the case of an applicant under sentence of 
death, a second or successive application presenting a claim 
previously presented in an application under this chapter 
shall be dismissed unless the interests of justice would be 
served by reconsideration of the claim.••. 
SEC. 5. CERTIFICATES OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The third paragraph ot section 2253, title 28, United 
States Code, is amended to r~ad as follows: 
''An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from 
the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the 
detention complained of arises out of process issued by a 
State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the 
order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certitlcate of 
probable cause. However, an applicant under sentence of death 




1 probable cause, except after denial of a second 
2 application.''. 
3 SEC. 6. LAW APPLICABLE IN CHAPTER 153 PROCEEDINGS. 
4 (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 153 of title 28, United States 
s Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 
6 ''52256. taw applicable 
7 ''(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
8 section, each claim under this chapter shall be governed by 
9 the law existing on the date the court considers the claim. 










applying that new rule would--
•• ( l) fail to serve the purpose of the new rule; 
\ \ 
( 2) 
. . . ' upset State authorities reasonable reliance on 
a difterent rule; and 
''(3) seriously disrupt the administration of 
justice. 
''(c) For purposes of this s@ction, a new rule is a sharp 
break from precedent that positively changes the law from 
that governing at the time the olaimant's sentence became 






existing before the rule's announcement, it was susceptible 
to debate among reasonable minds, 
••cd) For purposes of this section, a claimant's sentence 
becomes final at the conclusion of State court appellate and 
collateral litigation on the claimant's conviction and 
· wv ,u•1 , ,, ..,..,..,.., """""W"•V• rll \l vv 1• 11•1 -· ,...,,_ , , , ____ ,...,, .. ,,., . , , ...... 
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l sentence and any direct review in the Supreme Court of the 
2 United States.··. 
3 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The table of sections at the 
4 beginning of chapter 153 of title 28, United States Code, is 




















·•2256. Law applicable in Federal proceedings.''. 
SEC. 7. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT IN STATE COURT. 
Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended 
by adding after the subsection added by section 2 of this Act 
the following: 
··(h) A district court may decline to consider a claim 
under this section if--
'"(l)(A) the applicant previously failed to raise the 
claim in State court at the time and in the manner 
prescribed by State law, 
''<B) the State courts, for that reason refused to 
entertain the claim; and 
''cc) sueh retusal would constitute an adequate and 
independent State law ground that would foreclose direct 
review of the State court judgment in the Supreme Court 
of the United States; and 
''(2) the applicant fails to show cause for the 
failure to raise the claim in State court and prejudice 
to the applicant's right to fair proceedings or to an 
accurate outcome resulting trom the alleged violation of 
, .. ~ 




























the Federal right asserted, or that failure to consider 
the claim would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
''(3) For purposes of this subsection, cause is an 
explanation for procedural default not attributable to an 
intentional decision to ignore a State's procedural 
rules. A applicant may establish cause by showing that--
''(A) the factual or legal basis of the claim 
could not have been discovered by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence before the applicant could have 
raised the claim in State court, or was not 
discovered or asserted because the applicant's 
counsel failed to exercise reasonable diligence, . . . 
(B) the claim relies on a retroactive 
proposition of law announced after the applicant 
might have raised the claim in State court1 
''(C) the failure to raise the claim in State 
court was due to interference by State officials; or 
''(D) the failure to raise the claim in State 
court was due to counsel's ineffective assistance in 
violation of the United States Constitution.''~ 
SEC. 8. COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES. 
(a) RECUIREMENT.--A State in which capital punishment may 
be imposed shall provide legal services to--
(1) indigents charged with offenses for which capital 
punishment is sought1 
M08177 
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1 (2) indigents who have been sentenced to death and 
2 who seek appellate or collateral review in State court; 
3 and 
4 (3) indigents who have been sentenced to death and 
5 who seek certiorari review in the United States Supreme 
6 Court. 
7 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF APPOINTING AUTHORITY.--The State 
8 shall establish an appointing authority, which shall be--
9 (l) a statewide defender organization, appointing 
10 staff attorneys, members of the private bar, or both; or 
ll (2) a resource center, appointing staff attorneys, 
12 member~ of the private bar, or both. 
13 (c) FUNCTIONS OF APPOINTING AUTHORITY.--The appointing 
14 authority shall--
15 (1) recruit attorneys qualified to be appointed in 
16 the proceedings specified in subsection (a); 
17 (2) draft and annually publish rosters of qualified 
18 attorneys; 
19 (3) draft and annually publish procedures by which 
20 attorneys are appointed and standards governing the 
21 qualifications and performance of counsel appointed; and 
22 such standards shall include--
23 (A) membership in the bar of the jurisdiction or 
24 admission to practice pro hac vice; 
25 (B) knowledge and understanding of pertinent 
SENT av:couRTS SUBCOMMITTEE 5- 7-90 ;11;~1AM iNUU~~ ~uu,~,~~T ~V MM~ t" I '-
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1 legal authorities regarding the issues in capital 
2 cases in general and any case to which an attorney is 
3 appointed in particular; 
4 (C) skills in the management and conduct of 
5 negotiations and litigation in capital oases; 
6 (0) skills in the investigation of capital cases, 
7 the background of clients, and the psychiatric 
8 history and current condition of clients; 
9 (E) skills in trial advocacy, including the 
10 interrogation of defense witnesses, cross 
11 examination, and jury arguments; 
12 (F) skills in legal research and in the writing 
13 of legal petitions, briefs, and memoranda; and 
14 (G) akills in the analysis of legal issues 
lS bearing on capital cases; 
16 (4) periodically review the rosters, monitor the 
17 performance of all attorneys appointed, and delete the 
18 name of any attorney who--
19 (A) fails satisfactorily to complete regular 
20 training programs on the representation of clients in 
21 capital cases; 
22 (B) fails to meet performance standards in a case 
23 to which the attorney is appointed; or 
24 (C) fails otherwise to demonstrate continuing 
25 competency to represent clients in capital cases; 
MDBl77 
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1 (5) conduct or sponsor specialized training programs 
2 for attoPneys representing capital clients; 
3 (6) appoint two attorneys, lead counsel and co-
4 counsel, to represent a client in a capital caae at the 
S relevant stage of proceedings, promptly upon receiving 
6 notice of the need for the appointment from the relevant 
7 State court; and 
8 (7) report such appointment or the client's failure 
9 to accept counsel in writing to the court requesting the 
10 appointment. 
11 (d) DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY AND WAIVER.--Upon receipt 
12 of notice from the appointing authority that an individual 
13 entitled to the appointment of counsel under this section has 
14 declined to accept such an appointment, the court requesting 
15 th@ appointment shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, a 
16 hearing, at which the individual and counsel proposed to be 
· 17 appointed under this section shall be present, to determine 
18 the individual's competency to decline that appointment, and 
19 whether the individual has knowingly and intelligently 
20 declined it. 
21 (e) RosTERS.--
22 (1) lN GENERAL.--The appointing authority shall 
23 maintain two rosters of attorneys: one roster listing 
24 attorneys qualified to be appointed for the trial and 
25 sentencing stages of capital cases, the other listing 
MDB177 
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1 attorneys qualified to be appointed for the appellate, 
2 collateral and certiorari stages. Each of the rosters 
3 shall be divided into two parts, one listing attorneys 
4 qualified to be appointed as lead counsel, the other 
5 listing attorneys qualified to be appointed as co-
6 counsel. 
7 (2) LEAD COUNSEL AT TRIAL OR SENTENCING STAGE.--An 
8 attorney qualified to be appointed lead counsel at the 
9 trial or sentencing stages shall--
10 (A) be a trial practitioner with at least 5 years of 
11 experience in the representation of criminal defendants 
12 in felony cases; 
13 (B) have served as lead counsel or co-counsel at the 
14 trial or sentencing stages in at least 3 homicide cases 
15 tried to a jury and in at least one case in which a 
16 capital sentence was sought: 
17 (C) be familiar with the law and practice in capital 
18 cases and with the trial and sentencing procedures in the 
19 r@levant State; 
20 (D) have completed, within one year prior to the 
21 appointment, at least one specialized training program in 
22 th@ representation of capital defendants at the trial or 
23 sentencing stages; and 
24 (E) demonstrate the proficiency and commitment 




2 (3) CO-COUNSEL AT TRlAL OR SENTENCING STAGE.--An attorney 
3 qualified to be appointed co-counsel at the trial or 
4 sentencing stages shall--
5 (A) be a trial practitioner with at least 3 years of 
6 experience in the representation of criminal defendants 
7 in felony cases; 
8 (B) have served as lead counsel or co-counsel at the 
9 trial or sentencing stages of at least 2 homicide cases 
10 tried to a jury; and 
11 (C} meet the standards in paragraph {2)(C), (D), and 
12 (E) for lead counsel at the trial or sentencing stages. 
13 (4) LEAD COUNSEL AT APPELLATE, COLLATERAL, OR CERTIORARI 
14 STAGE.--An attorney qualified to be appointed lead counsel at 
lS the appellate, collateral, or certiorari stages shall--
16 (A) be an appellate practitioner with at least 5 
l7 years of experience in the representation of criminal 
18 clients in felony cases at the appellate, collateral, or 
1g certiorari sta9es1 
20 (B) have served as lead counsel or co-counsel at the 
21 appellate, collateral, or certiorari stages in at least 3 
22 cases in which the client had been convicted of a 
23 homicide offense and in at least one case in which a 
24 capital sentence had been imposed; 
25 (C) be familiar with the law and practice in capital 
VY •II• ww n1•1 ,, ,v wwi.. \,,l\,,ll,J•V•l"'\nl v vmrn-
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l cases and with the appellate, collateral, and certiorari 
2 procedures in the relevant State courts and the United 
3 States Supreme Court; 
4 (D} have completed, within one year prior to the 
S appointment, at least one specialized training program in 
6 the representation of capital clients at the appellate, 
7 collateral, and certiorari s t ages; and 
8 (E) demonstrate the proficiency and commitment 
9 neces sary to the provision of legal services to capital 
lO clients. 
11 (5) CO-COUNSEL AT APPELLATE, COLLATERAL, OR CERTIORARI 
12 STAGE.--An attorney qualified to be appointed co-counsel at 
13 the appellate, collateral, or certiorari stages shall--
14 (A) be an appellate practitioner with at least 3 
15 years of experience in the representation of criminal 
16 clients in telony cases at the appellate, collateral, or 
17 certiorari stages; 
18 (B) have served as lead counsel or co-counsel at the 
19 appellate, collateral, or certiorari stages in at least 2 
20 ca~es in which th~ client had been convicted of a 
21 homicide offense; and 
22 (C) meet the standards in paragraph (4)(C), (0), and 
23 (E) for lead counsel at the appellate, collateral, or 
24 certiorari stages. 
25 (f) APPOINTMENT OF NONROSTER ATTORNEYS IN CERTAIN 
, .. l ~ 
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l (ASES.--An attorney who is not listed on the relevant roster 
2 shall be appointed only on the request of the client 
3 concerned and in circumstances in which the attorney 
4 request~d is able to provide the client with high quality 
5 legal representation and justice would be served by the 
6 appointment. 
7 (g) PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS FROM PRIVATE BAR.--
8 (1) IN GENERAL.--Attorneys appointed from the private 
9 bar shall be--
10 (A) compensated for actual time and service, computed 
11 on an hourly basis and at a reasonable rate in light of 
12 the attorney's qualifications and experience and the 
l3 local market for legal representation in cases reflecting 
14 the complexity and responsibility of capital cases; 
15 (B) reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred in 
16 the representation of the client; and 
17 (C) reimbursed for the costs of law clerks, 
18 paralegals, investigators, experts, or other support 
1g services reasonably needed in the representation of the 
20 client. 
21 (2) COMPUTATION OF CERTAIN PAYMENTS.--Payments under 
22 subsection (g)(l)--
23 (A) with respect to law clerks and paralegals, shall 
24 be computed on an hourly basis reflecting the local 
25 market for such services; and 
i#17 
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1 (B) with respect to investigators and experts, shall 
2 be commensurate with the schedule of fees paid by State 
3 authorities for such services. 
4 (h) PROMPT PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS FROM PRIVATE 
5 BAR.--Appointed attorneys from the private bar shall receive 
6 prompt payment for legal services and reimbursement for 
7 expenses and support services upon the submission of periodic 
8 bills, receipts, or other appropriate documentation to the 
9 appointing authority or other appropriate State agency, The 
10 appointing authority shall promptly resolve any disputes with 
11 respect to such bills. Attorneys appointed as staff counsel 
12 for a defender organization or resource center shall be 
13 entitl~d to the support services listed in subsection 
14 (g)(l)(B) and (C) at public expense, 
15 (i) SANCTIONS.--
16 (1) IN GENERAL.--If--
17 (A) a State fails to provide counsel in a 
18 proceeding as required under this section; or 
19 {B) such counsel fails to meet the performanc~ 
20 standards established by the appointing authority; 
21 subsection (h) and section 2254(d) of title 28, 
22 United States Code, shall not apply with respect to 
23 such proceeding in a case under chapter 153 of title 
24 28, United States Code. 
25 (2) CHAPTER 153.--The court may in its discretion 
t " I IJ 
. . 
.. 
SE NT BY:couRTS SUBC OMM ITTEE 5- 7-90 ;12: oo PM ;HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM• 
MDB177 
18 
l provide relief under chapter 153 of title 28, United 
2 States Code, with respect to any failure described in 
3 paragraph (1). 
4 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The table of sections at the 
S beginning of chapter 153 of title 28, United States Code, 
6 is amended by adding after the item added by section 6 
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2257. Counsel in capital cases. 
SEC. 9. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES. 
Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended 
by striking subsections (a) through (b) and inserting the 
following: 
''<a) An individual may apply for a writ of habeas corpus 
under this chapter if the individual is in custody pursuant 
to a State court criminal conviction and sentence obtained in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
Onited States. 
''(b) A claim for relief under this section may be 
dismissed if the petitioner has failed to exhaust available 
and effective State court remedies before presenting the 
claim in Federal court. Any dismissal for failure to exhaust 
State court remedies shall be limited to a claim with respect 
to which currently available remedies have not been exhausted 
and shall be without prejudice to further application after 
h h 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-795 
PAUL DELO, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC-
TIONAL CENTER 11. WINFORD STOKES 
ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
[May 11, 1990] 
PER CURIAM. 
The State of Missouri has issued a warrant for the execu-
tion of Winford Stokes, which expires at 11:59 p.m. CDT on 
May 11, 1990. Stokes was convicted of capital murder in 
1979 and sentenced to death. -ms conviction and sentence 
were affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. 
Srokes, 638 S. W. 2d 715 (1982) (en bane). Stokes has since 
filed three separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the federal courts, each of which was denied. See Srokes v. 
Armontrout, 851 F. 2d 1085 (CAB 1988), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. -(1989); Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F. 2d 152 (CAB 
1989), stay of execution denied, 495 U. S. - (1990); Stokes 
v. Armantrout, No. 89-0133C(6) (ED Mo., March 16, 1990). 
On May 10, 1990, this Court denied a stay of execution pend-
ing the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari re-
lating to one of Stokes' first three habeas petitions. 495 
u. s. -. - ----- - .. 
While his application for stay of execution was pending in 
this Court, and within a matter of days before the scheduled 
execution, Stokes filed in the District Court a new application 
for stay of execution pending consideration of a fourth federal 
habeas petition. On the afternoon of May 9, the District 
Court""granted a stay of execution, stating that "the issues 
raised by petitioner's claim that his right to equal protec-
tion of the laws was violated by the Missouri state courts' 
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offense instructions in capital murder cases warrant the im-
position of a stay of execution. See Williams v. Armon.-
trout, 891 F. 2d 656, 658-69 (8th Cir. 1989), V<Uated upon 
grant of rehearing en bane (February 7, 1990)." Stokes v. 
Delo, No. 90-0505C(6) (ED Mo.). On the morning of May 
11, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
denied the State's motion to vacate the stay, one judge dis-
senting. The State then asked the in bane Court of Appeals 
to vacate the stay. That motion was also denied. The State 
has now filed with this Court a motion to vacate the stay of 
execution. 
A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or suc- 1 
cessive federal habeas petition should be granted only when 
there are "substantial grounds upon which relief might be 
granted." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895 (1988). 
There are no "substantial grounds" present in this case, be-
cause res ndent's fourth federal beas tition clearly con-
stitl!_tes an a use of the writ. See 28 U. S. C. 2254 u e 12-./4. 'f (t.) 
9(b); iil., §224.iCb). Stolces' claim that be was entitled to a 
lesser-included offense instruction, and that the Missouri 
Supreme Court has selectively applied its rules relating to 
that claim, could have been raised in his first ~tition for fed-
eral habeas corpus. The equal protection principles asserted 
by respondent are not novel and could have been developed 
long before this last minute application for stay of execution. 
Indeed, Stokes himself cites dissenting opinions filed in the 
Missouri Supreme Court in 1988 to support his contention. 
See, e.g., State v. Holland, 653 S. W. 2d 670, 679 (en bane) 
(Welliver, J., dissenting). 
The fourth federal habeas petition now pending in the Dis-
trict Court "is another example of abuse of the ·writ." 
\/Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 377, 378-880 (1984) (Powell, 
J., concurring, joined by four'other Justices) (vacatingstay 
of execution where claims in a successive petition could and 
should have been raised in a first petition for federal habeas 
corpus). The District Court abused its discretion in grant-
A-795-APPLICATION 
DELO 11. STOKES 8 
ing a stay of execution. The motion to vacate the stay is 
granted. 
It i8 so ordered. 
f 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-795 
PAUL DELO, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC-
TIONAL CENTER v. WINFORD STOKES 
ON APPIJCATION TO VACATE '$TAY 
(Mayll, 1990] 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE ScALIA join, concun'ing. 
I join in the opinion of the Court. The more than twenty-
four hour delay in the Court of Appeals' niling on the State's 
motion to vacate the stay granted on this fourth successive 
petition, one which discloses no substantial ground for relief, 
makes appropriate some additional comments. 
In this case, execution was scheduled for 12:01 a.m. Cen-
tral Daylight Time on May 11, 1990, under a warrant which 
expires, as the Court indicates, at 11:69 p.m. Central Day-
light Time on May 11, 1990. The Eighth Circuit found itself 
unable to rule on a motion to vacate a District Court stay 
until mid-afternoon on Friday, May 11. All Courts of Ap-
peals should consider implementing, and following, proce-
dures, such as those employed by the Eleventh Circuit, see 
Rule 22-8, Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit (1987), to .make certain that three active 
judges are av&lable to act upon emergency stays of this sort 
and to provide a timely ruling from the panel as a body, so 
that this Court may also rule upon the case where necessary 
and appropriate. 
If the Court of Appeals fails to act in a manner sufficiently 
prompt to preserve the jurisdiction of the Court and to pro-
tect the parties from the consequences of a stay entered with-
out an adequate basis, an injured party may seek relief in this 
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28 U. S. C. § 1651. See Mazwell v. Bishap, 385 U. S. 650 
(1967) (common law petition for writ of certiorari granted 
where shortness of time available before a scheduled execu-
tion made ordinary appeal procedure unavailable). 
Delay or default by courts in the federal system must not 
be allowed to deprive parties, including States, of the lawful 
process to which they are entitled. It is the duty of the 
Courts of Appeals to adopt and follow procedures which en-
sure all parties expeditious detenninations with respect to 
any request for a stay. Prompt review and determination is 
necessary to enable criminal processes to operate without 
undue interference from the federal courts, and to assure the 
proper functioning of the federal habeas procedure. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-795 
PAUL DELO, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC-
TIONAL CENTER -v. WINFORD STOKES 
ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
[May 11, 1990] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARsHALL joins 
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins as to Parts I, II, and Ill, 
dissenting. 
I 
Today the Court vacates a stay of execution entered by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri and found to be within that court's discretion by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sit-
ting en bane. Contrary to the majority's intimations, this 
case does not involve a last minute stay application by a de-
fendant on the eve of his execution. Rather, Winford Stokes 
raised an equal protection claim in an amendment to a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus pending in the District Court 
on April 6, 1990, before the current execution date had been 
set.• The rush to judgment is instigated here by the 
State's insistence on vacating the District Court's grant of a 
stay to consider Mr. Stokes' claim. 
''In lifting the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals, the 
Court has resorted to an exercise of power that is unusual 
and that should only be resorted to on the rare occasion in 
which a lower court has flagrantly abused its discretion." 
• At that time, a stay o! execution was in effect pending review by the 
Eighth Circuit of the District Court's denial of a previous habeas petition. 
This stay was dissolved by the Court of Appeals on April 24. On April 27, 
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Wainwright v. Adams, 466 U.S. 964,965 (1984). The Court 
does so on the basis of a rule that quite properly vests consid-
erable discretion in the court most familiar with the facts of 
the case and its prior history. Rule 9(b) provides that: 
"A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the 
judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds 
for relief and the prior determination was on the merits 
or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge 
finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those 
grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the 
writ." 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (emphasis added). 
The judge to whom Mr. Stokes applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus did not choose to dismiss on such grounds. To the 
contrary, Judge George F. Gunn found that: 
"Upon thorough consideration of the record before it, the 
Court concludes that the issues raised by petitioner's 
claim that his right to equal protection of the laws was 
violated by the Missouri state courts' selective applica-
tion of the rules governing lesser included offense in-
structions in capital murder cases W81Tant the imposition 
of a stay of execution." 
This Court has said repeatedly that the principles govern-
ing the disposition of successive writs "are addressed to the 
sound discretion of the federal trial judges. Theirs is the 
major responsibility for the just and sound administration of 
the federal collateral remedies. . . . We are confident that 
this power will be soundly applied." Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U. S. 1, 18-19 (1963). See also Wainwright v. 
Booker, 473 U. S. 935, 938 (1985) (MARsHALL, J., dissenting) 
("the lower court's decision is deserving of great weight''). 
Judge Gunn is particularly well-situated to exercise the dis-
cretion Congress has entrusted to him. He has heard three 
of Mr. Stokes' habeas applications, attending to the complex 
issues and detailed facts of Mr. Stokes' conviction over sev-
eral years. 
A-795-DISSENT 
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The Eighth Circuit, also closer to this case than we could 
hope to be in the few hours we have had to consider the mat-
ter, found the District Court's order sound and respollSl"ble. 
The Court of Appeals similarly is due considerable deference. 
See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 896 (1983) ("A stay of 
execution should first be sought from the court of appeals, 
and this Court generally places considerable weight on the 
decision reached by the courts of appeals in these circum-
stances"); O'Connor v. Board of Education, 449 U. S. 1301, 
1304 (1980) (STEVENS, J., in chambers) ("A Court of Appeals' 
decision to enter a stay is entitled to great deference"). 
Nonetheless, this Court has decided that both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals have committed such gross 
abuses of discretion that this Court must intervene. Noth-
ing in the Court's opinion explains adequately why the lower 
courts have been adjudged so harshly. 
II 
The Court vacates the stay granted by the District Court 
because in this Court's judgment, Mr. Stokes' claim "could 
have been raised long before this last minute application for 
stay of execution." Ante, at 2. I do not share the Court's 
confidence in the matter. While the "equal protection pri~ 
ciples asserted" by Mr. Stokes are hardly novel, ante, at 2 
(emphasis added)-indeed, they date back to 1868-the na-
ture of Mr. Stokes' claim is a different matter. 
To determine whether the claim is novel, we must begin by 
defining what it is. The lower courts have not ruled on the 
merits of Mr. Stokes' claim. Rather, they in effect have held 
his case in abeyance pending resolution of Williams v. Arm-
antrout, 891 F . 2d 656 (1989); in this case, tlie Eighth Circuit, 
sitting en bane, is reviewing a panel decision that the selec-
tive application by Missouri courts of the decision in State v. 
Baker, 636 S. W. 2d 902, 904-905 (1982) (en bane), cert. de-
nied, 459 U. S. 1183 (1983), "denies similarly situated defend-
ants in capital murder cases equal protection of the law in vi-
' 
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olation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution." 891 F. 2d, at 659. Given that the Eighth 
Circuit has not determined definitively the contours of the 
equal protection claim, it is impossible to say at this time 
whether the claim constitutes a "novel" one. 
Even if we could ascertain the precise character of the 
claim, in order to decide whether it could have been raised in 
a previous habeas petition we also would have to engage in a 
comprehensive review of Missouri state cases over the past 
decade. The Court today does not even purport to do this. 
In other contexts, the Court has noted that whether a legal 
claim is a "novel" one depends on an inquiry into existing 
precedents. Cf. Butler v. McKellar, - U. S. --, --
(1990) (that claim is "within the 'logical compass' of an earlier 
decision, or indeed that it is 'controlled' by a prior decision" 
does not- prevent it from being "new rule" for purposes of 
retroactivity). Thus, the mere fact that the Court today can 
point to an opinion of a dissenting Missouri Supreme Court 
Justice in 1983 hardly establishes that Mr. Stokes' claim is 
not "novel." 
m 
When a person's life is at stake we cannot tolerate such 
facile judgments. I would rather rely on the considered 
wisdom of the courts below, aided by their familiarity with 
Missouri law, that Mr. Stokes' claim cannot be decided until 
Williams is resolved. Given the dire consequences of error, 
the Court's rush to judgment is unseemly and indefensible. 
See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 877, 882-383 (1984) 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id., at 884 (MARsHALL, J., dis-
senting). There is no call to deny a district court the time it 
needs to consider properly petitioner's claim.· "It is ... im-
portant that before we allow human lives to be snuffed out we 
be sure-emphatically sure-that we act within the law." 
Rosenberg v. United States, 846 U. S. 278,821 (1953) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). 
A-795-DISSENT 
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IV 
5 
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all cir-
cumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
u. s. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would 
deny the application to vacate the stay entered by the Dis-
trict Court. 
SUPREl\lE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-795 
PAUL DELO, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC-
TIONAL CENTER v. WINFORD STOKES 
ON APPLICATION TO VACATE 'i:trAY 
[May 11, 1990) 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMON joins, 
dissenting. 
In my opinion both the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals-particularly when acting in bane-are in a far better 
position than this Court to determine whether a successive 
petition for habeas corpus constitutes an abuse of the writ. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's sum-
mary disposition of the application to vacate the stay entered 
by the District Court and upheld by the Court of Appeals. 
/ 
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our legal system -- the manner in which death sentences imposed 
by state courts are reviewed in the federal courts. Today the 
average length of time between the date on which a trial court 
imposes a sentence of death, and the date that sentence is 
carried out -- after combined state and federal review of the 
sentence -- is between seven and eight years. More than three 
years of this time are taken up by collateral review alone, with 
little certainty as to when that review has run its course. 
Surely a judicial system properly designed to consider both the 
claim of the state to have its laws enforced and the claim of the 
defendant to the protections guaranteed him by the federal 
Constitution should be able to reach a final decision in less 
time than this. 
The essence of the question is not the pros and cons of 
capital punishment, but the pros and cons of federalism. The 
- 2 -
Supreme Court has held that capital punishment is lawful if 
imposed consistently with the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment. Whether or not a state should choose to have capital 
punishment must be up to each state: thirty-seven states have 
elected to have it, and thirteen states have chosen not to have 
it. The capital punishment question is one which deeply divides 
people, and always has. But this question is only tangentially 
involved when we c1M1sider the procedures designed to provide 
collateral review in the federal courts for federal 
constitutional claims of defendants who have been sentenced to 
death. Surely the goal must be to allow the states to carry out 
a lawful capital sentence, while at the same time assuring the 
capital defendant meaningful review of the lawfulness of his 
sentence under the federal Constitution in the federal courts. 
This, as I have said, is essentially a question of federalism --
what is the proper balance between the lawful authority of the 
states and the role of federal courts in protecting 
constitutional rights? 
- 3 -
The writ of habeas corpus was originally a creature of the 
English common law, not designed to challenge judgments of 
conviction rendered after trial, but to challenge unlawful 
detention of citizens by the executive. It played much the same 
role in this country for the first century and a half of our 
existence. As a result of judicial decisions and congressional 
ratification of these decisions over the past century, however, 
it has evolved into something quite different. In civil 
litigation, as we all know, once the parties have had a trial and 
whatever appeals are available, the litigation comes to an end 
and the judgment is final. But in criminal cases a defendant 
whose conviction has become final on direct review in the state 
courts may nonetheless raise federal constitutional objections to - _ ___, 
that conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding. 
This system is unique to the United States; no such collateral 
attack is allowed on a criminal conviction in England where the ~ -
writ of habeas corpus originated. 
Reasonable people have questioned whether a criminal 
- 4 -
defendant ought to have as broad a ''second bite at the apple" in 
the federal courts as he presently does, but that is a question 
of policy for Congress to decide. So long as we are speaking of 
non-capital defendants, the present system does not present the 
sort of practical difficulties in the administration of justice 
that it presents in the case of capital defendants. This is 
because someone who is convicted and sentenced to prison for a 
term of years in state court, and wishes to challenge that 
conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding, has every 
incentive to move promptly to make that challenge. He must 
continue to serve his sentence while his federal claims are being 
adjudicated in the federal courts. Therefore, the sooner he 
obtains a decision on these claims, the sooner he will get the 
benefit of any decision that is favorable to him. This is true 
even though there is no statute of limitations for bringing the 
federal habeas proceeding. 
But the incentives are quite the other way with a capital 
defendant. All federal review of his sentence must obviously 
- 5 -
take place before the sentence is carried out; consequently, the 
capital defendant frequently finds it in his interest to do 
nothing until a death warrant is actually issued by the state. 
States also have varying systems of collateral review and one of 
the rules of federal habeas corpus is that certain kinds of 
claims must first be presented to the state courts in collateral 
proceedings before they may be decided on the merits by the 
federal courts. There is no constitutional right to counsel in 
the state collateral review proceedings, and therefore a capital 
defendant is frequently without legal advice as to how to 
proceed. The upshot is that often no action by the defendant is 
taken until shortly before the date set for execution. The 
result is foreseeable: arguments in state and federal courts over 
whether the execution should be stayed pending decision on the 
merits, because there is no provision for an automatic stay. 
Not only is there no statute of limitations for filing for 
federal habeas, but normal rules of res judicata do not apply. A 
criminal defendant is not necessarily barred from bringing a 
- 6 -
second petition in federal court after his first petition has 
been decided against him on the merits. Instead of res judicata, 
a doctrine of "abuse of the writ" has been developed, but its 
outlines are in some respects not fully developed. As a result, 
a capital defendant, after his first federal habeas petition is 
decided against him, may file a second petition, and even on 
occasion a third petition. On each occasion, arguments are 
pressed that an additional stay of execution is required in order 
for a court to consider these successive petitions. The result 
is that at no point until a death sentence is actually carried 
out can it be said that litigation concerning the sentence has 
run its course. 
The system at present verges on the chaotic. The eight 
years between conviction in the state court and final decision in 
the federal courts is consumed not by structured review of the 
arguments of the parties, but in fits of frantic action followed 
by periods of inaction. My colleagues and I can speak with first 
hand experience of this, and so can the district judges and the 
- 7 -
judges of the courts of appeals who regularly pass on these 
applications. It is not unknown for our court to have pending 
before it within a period of days not merely one application for 
a stay of execution but two from the same person: one seeking 
review of collateral state proceedings, and the other seeking 
review of federal habeas proceedings, both brought in the court 
of first instance within a matter of days before the execution is 
set to take place. Thus delay is not the only fault in the 
present system. The last-minute nature of so many of the 
proceedings in both the state courts and the federal courts 
leaves one with little sense that the legal process has run an 
orderly course, whether a stay is granted or whether it is 
denied. 
Let me speak briefly with you about the case of Jesse 
Tafero, who was executed on May 4, 1990. The death sentence ____,,,,.. 
imposed in his case was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida in 
1981, and in 1982 our Court denied a petition for certiorari. 
Tafero then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied in 
- 8 -
1985. The denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1986, 
and our Court denied certiorari in 1987. Tafero then filed 
another federal habeas petition, which was denied by the District 
Court in 1988. That denial was upheld by the Court of Appeals in 
1989, and our Court denied certiorari on April 16, 1990 --
approximately a month ago. By this time Tafero had had two 
federal habeas petitions proceed through every level of the 
federal courts following the earlier direct review of his 
sentence by the Supreme Court of Florida. The state scheduled 
his execution for May 2, 1990. 
On April 27th, Tafero filed an application in our Court to 
suspend the order denying certiorari pending filing for a 
rehearing, which was denied. Three days earlier, on April 24th, 
he had filed with the Florida Circuit Court his third motion to 
vacate the judgment of death under the Florida proceeding for 
collateral review. This determination was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Florida on April 30th. Tafero then filed his 
third federal habeas petition in the District Court, and that 
~ -
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court granted a 48-hour stay of execution to consider it. On May 
3rd the Court denied the petition, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
that denial, and our Court denied a stay of execution. 
Tafero was executed the following day. 
This system cries out for reform. I submit that no one --
whether favorable to the prosecution, favorable to the defense, 
or somewhere in between -- would ever have consciously designed 
it. The question is how the present law can be changed to deal 
with these problems while still serving the federalism goal which 
I mentioned previously. 
In June 1988 I established an Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases under the chairmanship of retired 
Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. In addition to Justice 
Powell, I appointed to this Committee, the Chief Judges of the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, the two federal 
appellate courts having had the most experience with litigation 
about capital sentences, and a district judge from each of these 
circuits. I thought it best to have people on the Committee who 
- 10 -
not only had a judicial perspective, but who had "hands on" 
experience in dealing with capital sentence proceedings. 
~ 
The Committee investigated ways of improving both the 
fairne~ iciency of our system of collateral review in 
death penalty cases. In September of 1989 it issued its report 
recommending the coordination of our state and federal legal 
systems in capital cases and the structuring of collateral 
review. The Report concluded that capital cases "should be 
subject to one fair and complete course of collateral review in 
the state and federal system, free from time pressure of 
impending execution and with the assistance of competent 
counsel." 
Under the Powell Committee proposal, persons convicted of 
capital crimes and sentenced to death would, after a full set of 
appeals, have one opportunity to collaterally attack their 
sentences at the state level and one such opportunity at the 
federal level. Second and successive petitions for collateral 
review would be entertained only if the petitioner could cast 
- 11 -
doubt upon the legitimacy of his conviction of a capital crime. 
In the absence of underlying doubt concerning guilt or innocence, 
itself, courts would not entertain repetitive petitions attacking 
the appropriateness of the death sentence. 
In the interests of reliability and fairness, the Powell 
Committee proposal would permit states to opt into the unified 
system of collateral review only where they agreed to provide --
i1 '' competent counsel in state collateral proceedings. Under current 
federal law, counsel is provided in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings, but not in state proceedings. The Powell Committee 
proposal would also require an automatic stay of execution to 
perm~t the prisoner to bring his petition in an orderly fashion 
and without the pressure of pending execution, and would create a 
new automatic right of appeal from the federal district court to 
the federal court of appeals. 
I believe that the Powell Committee Report strikes a sound 
balance between the need for ensuring a careful review in the 
federal courts of a capital defendant's constitutional claims and 
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the need for the state to carry out the sentence once the federal 
courts have determined that its imposition was consistent with 
federal law. The Conference of State Chief Justices at its 
meeting last February unanimously endorsed the report of the 
Powell Committee. When that report was presented to the Judicial 
---------------Conference of the United States in March, five changes were 
proposed to make it closer to the position taken by the American 
Bar Association, which would not only enlarge the scope of 
federal review but make successive habeas petitions more readily 
available than at present. The Judicial Conference was closely 
..... --
divided on each of these five amendments, and adopted only two of 
them. 
The first adopted would set more stringent standards for the 
appointment of counsel in state proceedings, and make those 
standards applicable not merely on collateral review but in trial 
and appellate proceedings in the state courts. The second would 
allow a successive habeas petition if the defendant bases the 
claim on a "factual predicate" that could not have been 
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discovered with due diligence and would "undermine" the court's 
cbnfidence "in the appropriateness of the sentence of death." 
This latter amendment, in particular, strikes me as so vague and 
ill-defined as to substantially defeat the purpose of the 
recommendations of the Powell Committee. 
Both Houses of Congress will shortly address themselves to 
this question. The Senate will consider legislation very 
shortly, and later on this month a House Judiciary Subcommittee 
will begin hearings on this subject. Two bills have been 
introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond, the ranking minority member 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The first would allow federal 
habeas review only where a prisoner is unable to secure "full and 
fair adjudication" of his claims in state court. My own view is 
that, while this approach might commend itself some years hence, 
it does not do so at the present time. There have been a 
significant number of capital sentences set aside because federal 
courts decided that the sentences did not conform to the 
requirements of the Eighth Amendment. Very likely this is 
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because the contours of the Eighth Amendment as applied to 
capital sentencing have only evolved over the last fifteen years. 
If the present scope of federal habeas review can be retained 
without the delay and other faults contained in it, I think it 
should be. The second bill introduced by Senator Thurmond 
embodies the Powell Committee report, and I think that report 
shows how the present scope of federal habeas review can be 
retained without unnecessary delays. 
Another bill, S.1757, has been introduced by Senator Joseph ---- -----
Biden, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. It, in my 
view, is at the other end of the spectrum and would actually ---
exacerbate the delays and repetitiousness of the present system. 
It would allow successive petitions where there is a claim of 
"miscarriage of justice." This phrase is apparently derived from 
recent decisions of our Court in another area of habeas law; as 
applied to capital cases it is not well-defined, and its use in 
regulating successive petitions may, as Justice Powell pointed 
out in his testimony, "produce confusion and open the door for 
- 15 -
abuse." 
Another area where the Powell Committee recommendations are, 
in my judgment, superior to the proposals contained in S.1757 is 
the area of procedural default. Under the rules of procedural 
default, a defendant must object to errors at the time of trial. 
Where the defense fails to object to an error, it waives its 
opportunity to raise the claim. The purpose of the procedural 
default rules is to assure that errors are pointed out at a time 
when they can easily be corrected, not years later in an attempt 
to obtain a new trial. The Powell Committee Report would leave 
these rules in effect. S.1757, by contrast, would make it easier 
for a prisoner to raise claims for the first time years after 
trial, thus exacerbating the problems of piecemeal litigation and 
delay that characterize the present system. And, it would 
accomplish this highly questionable goal by overturning a series 
of Supreme Court cases. 
S.1757 would also overturn an entire body of Supreme Court 
precedent in an area where Congress has never previously ---" 
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legislated. For nearly a quarter of a century the Supreme Court 
has wrestled with the problem of whether constitutional decisions 
announcing a new rule of law should or should not be applied 
''retroactively." The Court has gradually, one might say by a 
process of trial and error, decided that decisions which announce 
a new rule should be applied across the board to cases on direct 
review of a state conviction, but that with certain exceptions 
they should not be applied by federal habeas courts to a 
defendant whose trial took place before the new rule was 
announced. The reason for such a doctrine seems obvious: unless 
the new rule is truly a "fundamental principle," essential to a 
just result, state courts should not be penalized for applying 
the federal constitutional law which was in effect at the time of 
trial. But S.1757 would simply abrogate these decisions and 
permit capital defendants to challenge their convictions and 
sentences on the basis of constitutional decisions which had not 
even been announced at the time the case was in the state courts. 
The bill introduced by Senator Thurmond, the bill introduced 
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by Senator Biden, and the Powell Committee Report all provide 
some form of statute of limitations to regulate the time in which 
capital defendants must avail themselves of the opportunity for 
collateral review. The Powell Committee Report sets the statute 
of limitations at six months; S.1757 introduced by Senator Biden 
sets it at one year. A statute of limitations is essential if we 
are to obtain orderly federal habeas review of the sentences, and 
so long as the capital defendant has counsel at this stage it 
imposes no unreasonable burden on him. 
At this moment, there are about twenty-two hundred capital 
defendants on the various "death rows" in state prisons. There 
is no doubt that when some of these defendants present their 
constitutional claims to federal courts, their sentences will be 
set aside. Others of these defendants will, after full federal 
review, obtain a determination that the sentences imposed on them 
were consistent with the federal Constitution. Defendants who 
will ultimately prevail in their claims should not have to wait 
eight years for a decision to that effect, and states seeking to 
- 18 -
carry out the sentence upon defendants whose claims are rejected 
by federal courts should not have to wait eight years to do that. 
Fair-minded people, whether they personally oppose or favor the 
death penalty, should have no difficulty agreeing that the 
present system is badly in need of reform. 
All of the pending Senate bills on this matter are clothed 
in the garb of "reform," but unfortunately, not all of them are 
designed to achieve the sort of reform which the system badly 
needs. The proposal of the Powell Committee, in my view, 
accomplishes the task while the others do not. Under that 
proposal the capital defendant is given the necessary tools and 
the necessary incentives to make all of his constitutional claims 
in his first federal habeas proceeding, and that proceeding is 
allowed to run its full course in both the district court and in 
the court of appeals without any threat of imminent execution. 
If the result of these proceedings is a determination that the 
state sentence is consistent with the United States Constitution, 
that should (with rare exceptions) conclude the federal review, 
- 19 -
and the state should be able to carry out its sentence. This is 
a solution to the problem in the best tradition of our federal 
system. It is a solution which will restore public confidence in 
the way capital puni~hment is imposed and carried out in our 
country. 
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I. Introduction 
As yo\l already know, thj s proposal goes beyond Sena tor 
· Bi den I s bill i. n many res pe~. It is a far -cry I rom the Ad"""Hoc 
Co~rcconunendations <.J_J n this memorandum, I will summarize 
HR 4737 for you. Jn addition, Twill review my recent meeting 
with staff membc rs from the off i.ce s 0 f Sena tors Nunnana- cn•aham. 
They are 'lv"")r ing, on i:\ compromise proposal thato~son the 
Biden bill ~hough in my opinion this attempt is not very 
sensible if one is · interested in developing a balanced piece of 
habeas corpus reform legjslation in the capital punishment area . 
.Final)y, I will mention some ideas for improving the capital 
litigation process at the front rather the back end which either 
you or T might mention before the subcommittee next week. Each 
of these proposals could be implemented without undercutting the 
basic approach outlined in the Ad Hoc Committee's 
recommendations. 
l I. HR 4 7 J 7 S umrna r i :: e ct ( /-( u..A.--~ /3 d__.L - q ,:t-<--1- ~£/ ~ 
~ .I$'-~~ t-U.- . jJ~ 
A. General Structure ~dtt:..~ 
The proposed bill consi~ts of nine sections. It borrows a ..Jt.-?;(_u-/4.~i--
number of ideas from t h_e ~ei:ort of the Ad Hoc Commi t_tee, but ~ 
adds or ext~nds them s J.. ,gn1f1.cantly at. almost every Juncture. C:..~ 
The provisions of this proposal arc mandatory with the exce:etion 
of the counsel provisions.;,. You will note that all changes are ~ -
proposed as additions to the present habeas corpus legislation, 9f-~ 
not as a new and sep.-i.rate chapter limited in scope to capital .fr..<.. ~ 
cases. Thi~ appears to be especially important in connection ~
with secticrn 7 of the bill dealing with procedural default. The lo J.2-zs4-
counsel mcchani sm is technically optional with each state but. .J 
only jf the state i.s willing to litigate capital cases without; ~ ~
(a) a.ny federal proc~dural default. rule at all even the very  
forgiving $ection 7 prol~edural default which is proposed as a 'tr!> ~ 
substitute for Wainwright v. Sykes and (b) any presumption that 1 ~ .-P !I-le 
state fact findin~ is correct under section 2254(d). ~ /< 
, i Some provisions apply to non-capital cases. 
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Effectively, HR 4 7 37 proposes ~s that a.r_e , highly 
icial to capita! r iti ants whether or not a .. _ _ --
state pr·ovides counsel in a c cordance with the exactin.g 
competency rules of sec t ion 8. In a dd ition, it provides de novo 
federal review in all capital cases if a state ignores orfails 
to comply with se c t i on 8. Bear in mind here that existing law 
already provides for the federal appointment of counsel in 
capital cases anyway. This means that a state 1 s inability or 
refusal to appoint 'counsel that are competent under the section 
8 s -candards bee ome s an irrelevancy. The real defense of a 
ca ital c se under HR 4737 will be"in in t~"the 
event of non-comp iance w1. 1 sect.1on he proponents of HR 
4737 probably do not see this as a penalty mechanism, but rather 
as the preferred consequence of the law if enacted. In this 
re s pec-t, HR 4 7 37 :i. s an extraordinarily di sengenuous proposal. 
B. Section-By-Sect.ion Analy:::ls ;~ 
1. Sect i.on 2--It, c st.a bli shes a one year requirement fer 
the filing cf a federal habeas corpus action in capital cases. 
The time period runs from the point when a state conviction is 
d e emed to have become final. Vinality includes the opportunity 
fer Supreme Court review. The Ad Hoc Committee proposal links 
the t i me period ( 180 d ays under- ou1· p r oposal) to the date of 
a ppointment of c oun s el. 
Section 2 i n cludes telling rules similar in some respects 
to t hose prop~scd by the Ad Hoc Committee. The one year period 
mentioned above is tolled indefinitely in capital cases if 
counsel is not appointed in full compliance with section 8. Of 
course, since one can challenge the competency of counsel 
appointed under se c tion 8 even in habea~ proceedings, one never 
knows whether this tolling rule is applicable until the end of 
the first round of federal habeas review- -not an optimal 
approach if you are trying to promote some degree of efficiency 
in the operation of t he ~ystem. 
The r e mainin g tolling rules are probably comparable to ours 
except section 2 which would t oll the one year period in 
situations where a cert i orari petition is filed following state 
habeas corpus review. The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that two 
chances for Supreme Court review rather than three was adequate. 
* Section 1 just sta t es the tit.le of the proposed legislation: 
the '' Habeas Corpus Revision Act of 1990. " 
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Section 2 provides for dismissal if the one year time 
requi r ement is not s atisfied, but allows for an override of the 
dismi s sal sanction if a litigant can make a colorable showing of 
innocence or ineligibili t y for the death penalty. An override 
is al s o avail a ble if ''other exceptional circumstances warrant a 
waiver. n -t¾This is an exam~le of the bill ' s preference for back 
end rat h er Tront end remedies. 
2. Section 3--It provides for mandatory stays of execu-
tions i n capital cases. It is comparable to the proposal of 
the Ad Hoc Committee. l don 1 t think t h at it warrants any 
c omment b efore the subcommi t tee. 
3. Sect i on 4--It nomi n ally restr i cts successive petitions 
in capital ca s es. If a claim has not. been previously raised , 
this section p r ovides se v eral di.stinct ways to litigate it in a 
federal habeas proceeding. the most important of which is in 
cases whe r e a new ri gh t is made retroactively applicable. This 
p r ovision appe a rs in n o cuous until you turn to s ection 6 which 
overrules Teague v. La ne. The combined effect o f sections 4 and 
6 provide an excell e nt legal basis for filing a colorable 
successive petition. 
In addition, a litigant can file a colorable second 
petit i on if the new claim raises guilt / innocence issues or 
questions about the 11 appropriateness 11 of a capital sentence. 
This p r ovision reflects a major point of difference with the Ad 
Hoc Committee r ec cmmend a tions. Then _. as i f the preceding rule 
were not su f ficient, se c tion 4 allows for a successive petition 
based on a previously unlit. iga.ted claim if nnecessary" to 
prevent a miscarria ,ge of justice. Both the :t appropriateness tr 
and the :r miscarriage of justicc 11 standards are vague and fact 
s p e c i f i c i n n ,it u r e . I t i s d i ff i cu 1 t t o s e e how they in any 
meaningfu l s ense promote finality. Whe n you couple them with 
the retr oactivity rule that section 4 incorporates by reference 
f rom section 6, the idea that this provision is a limit on 
successive petitions is difficult to understand. 
Finally, section 4 allows a federal court in capital cases 
to reconsider previously litiga ted claims if the petitioner can 
demonstrate that it would be in "the interests of justice" to 
reconsider such claim~. 
4. Section 5--It deals with certificates of probable cause 
to appeal and is comparable to the Ad Hoc Committee 1 s proposal. 
It doesn 1 t warrant comment before the subcommittee. 
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5, Section 6--This section overrules Teague v. Lane 
flatly and unequivocally. It allows a petitioner in a capital 
case to get the benefit of the la-w in effect at the time a 
decision is handed down. Of course, this principle applies 
whenever a successive petition is filed as well. It is ciucial 
to ~he establishment of the infinite regression model of capital 
defense litigation. 1 don't see how any state that has capital 
punishment would view this provision favorably. Bear in mind 
that this provision is not linked to any reform of death penalty 
procedures jn capital habeas litigation. It would apply to all 
federal habeas cases capital and non-capital. --
6. Section 7--This section o_verrules Wainwright v. Sykes. 
It. pays nominal respect to the ind epen'aent .and adequate state 
ground rationale and then softens the proceduial default rule to 
the point that it is virtually non-existent. In addition to the 
"causen ad "prejudice" tests as an escape fro m proce cturalo ar, 
section 7 permits a litJ. 0 ant to overcome procedural bar if 
necessary to avoid a "miscarriage of justice". It then goes on 
to elaborate on the 11 cause 11 standard. It makes clear that the 
"knowing bypass" test is being revived and that it would present 
the only clear cut legal basis for finding a lack of cause. 
Another notewo1·thy as pee t of this elaboration on the "cause 11 
standard is that any development in the law after a state 
conviction has become final on direct appeal is per se 11 cause 11 
for failure to raise a claim under section 7. 
Like the retroactivity 
applies to all cases, capital 
whether a state complies with 
in section 8. 
rule in section 6, this section 
and non-capital. It is immaterial 
the counsel requirements set forth 
7. Section 8--This section establishes a detailed and 
highly exacting series .!!.._f 'c~p.,ll ~ S tandafas '~ and mal<:es them 
app ica roug out all state and "f'e cteral phases of capital 
litigation . The obligation to fund and organi::-.e this scheme 
rests entirely with the states having capital punishment . The 
costs are potentially so great that few states, if any, would be 
tempted to try to comply with section 8. 
Suffice it to say , this section would limit the number of 
attorneys who can qua) ify as lead or (.,o-counsel in capital 
1 i tiga tion to a highly select f ew--mostly individuals already 
heavily committed to capital defense litigation in the first 
place and hence those most inclined morally and philosophically 
to ext end the length of capital 1 i tiga.tion to its absolute 
limit. The sanction for failure to turn capital defense 
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litigation over to this group of att orn e ys i s to deny any effe ct 
to state court adjudicati0n in capital cases and then to turn 
such cases over· to capital defense specialists for de novo 
review in federal court. 
In my opinion, the sanction mechanism is not calculated to 
generate s t,1 te efforts to develop better sys terns of capital 
defense representation. It is designed to assure that virtually 
any politically feasible attempt to improve and extend such 
representational schemes cannot succeed. This effectively sets 
the stage for shifting all serious and potentially final review 
ln capital cases over to the federal court s . In effect, section 
8 would make state involvement in capital cases a long and 
expensive prologue to the main event. Again, it is difficult to 
understand how any state which has capital punishment could 
justify supporting section 8 or virtually any part of HR 4737. 
8. Section. 9--This provision appears to soften Rose v. 
Lundy. It permits dismissal of non-exhausted claims but 
does not re qui re dismissal. When one couples this with the 
proposed changes i.n the retroact i vi ty and procedural default 
rules, section 9 would permit capital habeas litigation to be 
conducted in a piecemeal fashion. It would make the process 
more confused and confusing than anyone can reasonably imagine 
at this point. 
Note that this sect.ion applies to all cases, capital and 
non-capital. 
C. Conclusion .... 
HR 4737 is a bill that reforms habeas corpus generally. It 
is not limited to capital cases. It is the ideal approach to 
habeas corpus review if you are dee ly skeptical of the way in 
which state criminal ·ustice systems o er e. t g1.ves itt c 
f1.na ity or prcsumpt:.ion of correctness even in no·n-capital cases 
and almost none in capital cas~s. If the skeptics are correct 
in their assessment of state criminal justice systems, then HR 
4737 should have been enacted long ago. If the states are 
unwilling to ac c ep-r, the proffered challenge to the underlying 
fairness of their criminal justice systems, as they no doubt 
are, it is difficult to understand why HR 4737 was proposed. In 
states where capital punishment is not in force, one would have 
particular cause to wonder why this statute is needed. 
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III. Staff Meeting with Nunn and Graham Representatives 
On Monday, May 14 , 1990, I met with representatives from 
the staffs of Senators Nunn and Graham. They are working on a 
compromise based on the Biden bill. Senator Graham is quite 
eager to get some type of habeas corpus reform legislation 
passed. Essentially, he is willing to go along with the Bidcn 
bill if the procedural default rule in it is deleted. The trade 
off is that Senator Graham would support a provision worded 
almost exactly like section 6 of HR 4737 overruling 
Teague v. Lane. l t is ha rd to understand why Senator Graham 
v i ews this as a compromise since the 11 new law" argument often 
provides an arguable basis for showing 11 causet1 under 
Wainwright v. Sykes. In any event, Senator Graham finds some 
kind of equivalcncy that eludes me. 
Senator Graham disliked the Ad Hoc Committee report 1 s 
refusal to allow second petitions challenging the sentence 
determination. His staff person appeared to understand what I 
said in explanation of the Ad Hoc Commi ttce position, but he 
believed that Senator Graham would never accept it as an 
adequate rationale. To Senator Graham, it makes the system look 
like it is willing to send persons to their fate wh~le ignoring 
potentially valid arguments against the imposition of capital 
punishment in particular cases. 
IV. Other Reform Options 
~
I list here some additional steps that would improve the 
fairness of capital litigation at the front end and have the 
additional benefit of making federal review more effective and 
final when it occurs: 
1. Establish discovery rules in capital cases that would 
give capital defense litigators access to the prosecutor 1 s files 
or designated portions of them in advance of trial. Include i n 
this the right under designated circumstances to depose 
witnesses in c apit.al cases. 
2. Establish immunity rules under which a capital litigant 
can obtain the testimony of individuals who might have favorable 
information but would otherwise be exposed to possible self-
incrimination. 
3. Make mental and physical examinations of the defendant 
mandatory in all cases in which capital punishment is sought. 
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4- Require more liberal dis c overy in both 
federal post convi c tion proceeding s s o that 
undiscovered evidence that might give rise to 




5. Require states to make more liberal use of foreign jury 
panels in ca:-.;es where the community climate for a trial is 
potentially inflamed. 
6. Provide sufficient federal funding so that the states 
can develop schemes of representation in capital cases that meet 
congressional standards. 
IV. Conclus i.on 
This overview became more detailed than I had originally 
intended. Please call me or have Hew Pate · call me for further 
discussion if that would be helpful to you. I intend to arrive 
early enough on Wednesday, May 23, 1990 to be available for a 
full discussion of the upcoming testimony. 
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I. Introduction 
As you already know, this proposal goes beyond Sena tor 
·Biden 1 ~ bill in many respects. It is a far cry from the Ad Hoc 
Committee 1·ccommendations. In this memorandum, I will summarize 
HR 4737 for you. Jn addition, I will review my recent meeting 
with staff members from the offic~s of Senators Nunn and Graham. 
They are w,Hking on a compromise proposal that builds on the 
Biden bill ~hough in my opinion this attempt is not very 
sensible if one is interested in developing a balanced piece of 
habeas corpus reform legjslation in the capital punishment area. 
final) y, I wi 11 mention some ideas for improving the capital 
litigation process at the front rather the back end which either 
you or T might mention before the subcommittee next week. Each 
of these proposals could be implemented without undercutting the 
basic approach outlined in the Ad Hoc Committee's 
recommendations. 
II. HR 4737 Summari~ed 
A. General Structure 
The proposed bill consists of nine sections. It borrows a 
number of ideas from the report of the Ad Hoc Commit tee, but 
adds or extends them significantly at almost ~very juncture. 
The provisions of this proposal arc mandatory with the exception 
r' . UL 
of the counsel provisions. * You will note that all changes are 
proposed as ad~tions to the present habeas corpus legislation, 'h-o-I-
not as a. new - an sep,:1rate chapter . 1.mited in ~pe to ca£_ital ~ 
~s. This appears to be especially important in connection 
wj th section 7 of the biJ.J. dealing with procedural default. The k 'l:..4-ft-<_f-~ 
counsel rncchan-i sm is technically optional with each state but ~-
only if the state is willing to litigate capital cases without: ~ 
(a) any federal proc~dural default rule at all even the very ~ 
forgiving ~ection i procedural default whi,~h is proposed as a 
substitute for Wainwright v. Sykes and (b) any presumption that 
state fact finding is correct under section 2254(d). 
* Some provisions apply to non-capital cases. 
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Effec t ively , HR 4 7 37 proposes changes that are highly 
benef i cial to capital 1 i tigants whet.her or not a . .. _ 
state pr·ovides counsel in accordance with the exactin,g 
competency rul~s of section 8. In addition, it provides de~ 
federal review in all capi t al cases if a state ignores or fails 
to comply with section 8. Bear in mind here that existing law 
alr e ady provides for the federal appointment of counsel in 
cap i tal cases anyway. This means that a state 1 s inability or 
refusal to appoint counsel that are competent under the se c tion 
8 standards becomes an irrelevancy. The real defense of a 
capital case under HR 4737 will begin in federal court in the 
event of non-complianc ~ with section 8 . The proponents of HR 
4737 proba bly do not see this as a penalty mechanism, but rather 
as the preferr e d con s equence of the law if enacted . In this 
respect. , HR 4 7 37 is an extraordinarily d isengenuous proposal. 
B. Section-By-Section Analysis •~ 
1. Sect ion 2- -It c sta bli shes a one year requirement for 
the filing of a federal habeas corpus action in capital cases. 
The time period run s from the point wh en a state conviction is 
deemed to ha v e become final. ¥inality i ncludes the opportunity 
for Supreme Court review. The Ad Hoc Committee proposal links 
the time period ( 18 0 days under our proposal) to the date of 
appointment of couns e l. 
Sectio n 2 i ncludes tolling rules similar in some r espects 
to those propo se d b y the Ad Hoc Committee. The one year period 
mentioned above i s tolled indefinitely in capital cases if 
counsel is net appointed in full compliance with section 8. Of 
course, since one can challenge the competency of counsel 
appointed under section 8 even in habeas proceedings, one never 
knows whether this tolling rule is applicable until the end of 
the first round of federal habeas review--not ·an optimal 
approach if you are tryi_ng to promote some degree of efficiency 
in the operation of the system. 
The remaini n g tolling rules are probably comparable to ours 
except section 2 which would toll the one year period in 
situations where a certiorari petition is filed following state 
habeas corpus review. The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that two 
chances for Supreme Court review rather than three was adequate . 
* Section 1 just states the title of the proposed legislation: 
the l! Habeas Corpus Revision Act of 1990. 11 
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Section 2 provides for dismissal if the one year time 
requirement i s not satis f ied, but allows for an override of the 
dismissal sanction if a litigant can make a colorable showing of 
innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty . An override 
is also available if !!o t her exceptional circumstances warrant a 
waiver. 11 tf)This is an exampl e of the bill I s preference for back 
end rather Tront end remedies. 
2. Section 3--It p r ovides for mandatory stays of execu-
tions in capital cases. It is comparable to the proposal of 
the Ad H<.)C Committee. l d o n ' t think that it warrants any 
comment before the subcommittee. 
3. Sect ion 4--It nominally restricts successive petitions 
in capital cases . If a claim has not be e n previously raised, 
this section provides several distinct ways to litigate it in a 
federal h a beas proceeding~ the most i mportant of which is in 
cases where a new right is made retroactively applicable. This 
provision appears innocuous until you turn to sect.ion 6 which 
overrules Teague v. Lane. The combined effect of sections 4 and 
6 provide an excellent legal basis for filing a colorable 
successive petition. 
In addition, a litigant can file a colorable second 
petition if the new claim raises guilt / innocence issues or 
questions at-o u t the uappropriatenessu of a capital sentence. 
This p rovision reflects a major point of diff e re nce with the Ad 
Hoc Committee recc- mmendations. Then 1 as if the p-receding rule 
were not sufficient , section 4 all o ws for a successive petition 
based on a p reviously unlit. iga.t.ed claim if ttne-cessary 11 to 
prevent a miscarriage of just ice. Both the ;, appropriateness 11 
and the ::miscarriage of justicc 11 standards are vague and fact 
s p e c i f i c i n n .1 t \Jr e . I t i s di ff i cul t t o s e e how they i n any 
meaningful sense promote finality. When you couple them with 
the retroactivity rule that section 4 incorporates by reference 
from section 6 , the idea that this p rovision is a limit on 
successive pet. itioris is difficult to understand. 
Finally, section 4 allows a federal court in capital cases 
to rec0nsider previously li~igated claims if the petitioner can 
demonstrate that it would be in 11 the interests of justice 11 to 
reconsider such claim~. 
4. Section 5--It deals with certificates of probable cause 
to appeal and is comparable to the Ad Hoc Committee 1 s proposal. 
It doesn't warrant comment before the subcommittee . 
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5. Section 6--Thls section overrules Teague v. Lane 
flatly and unequivocally. It allows a petitioner in a capital 
case to get the benefit of the law in effect at the time a 
decision is handed down. Of course, this principle applies 
whenever a successive petition is filed as well. It is crucial 
to the establishment of the infinite regression model of capital 
defense litigation. I don't see how any state that has capital 
punishment would view this provision favorably. Bear in mind 
that this provision is not linked to any reform of death penalty 
procedures jn capital habeas litigation. It would apply to all 
federal habeas cases capital and non-capital . -
6. Section 7--This section overrules Wainwright v. Sykes. 
It pays nominal respect to the independent and adequate state 
ground rationale and then softens the p rocedu~al default rule to 
the point that it is virtually non-exi stent. In addition to the 
"cause" and ''prejudice" tests as an escape from procedural bar, 
section 7 permits a litigant to overcome procedural bar if 
necessary to avoid a "miscarriage of justice". It then goes on 
to elaborate on the "cause 11 standard. It makes clear that the 
"knowing bypass" test is being revived and that it would present 
the only clear cut legal basis for finding a lack of cause. 
Another noteworthy aspect of this elaboration on the 11 cause 11 
standard is that any development in the law after a state 
conviction has become final on direct: appeal is per se 11 cause 11 
for failure to raise a clalm under section 7. 
Like the retroac.t i.. vi ty 
applies to all cases, capital 
whether a state complies with 
in section 8. 
rule in section 6, this section 
and non-capital. It is immaterial 
the counsel requirements set forth 
7. Section 8--Thi.s section establishes a detailed and 
highly exacting series of counsel standards and makes them 
applicable throughout all state and federal phases of capital 
litigation. The obligation to fund and organize this scheme 
rests entirely with the states having capi t.al punishment. The 
costs are potentially so great that few states, if any, would be 
tempted to try t~ comply with section 8. 
Suffice it to say , this section would limit the number of 
attorneys who can qualify as lead or c.o-counsel in capital 
litigation to a highly select few--mostly individuals already 
heavily committed to capital defense litigation in the fir s t 
place and hence those most inclined morally and philosophically 
to extend the length of capital 1 i tigation to its absolute 
limit. The sanction for failure to turn capital defense 
P. 0 1 
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litigation 0vcr to this group of attorneys is to deny any effect 
to state court adjudication in capital cases and then to turn 
such cases over to capital defense specialists for de novo 
review in federal court. 
In my opinion, the sanction mechanism is not calculated to 
generate s t,:1. te efforts to develop bette I' systems of capital 
defense representation. It is designed to assure that virtually 
any politically feasible attempt to improve and extend such 
representational schemes cannot succeed . This effectively sets 
the stage for shifting all serious and potentially final review 
in capital cases over to the federal courts. In effect, section 
8 would make state involvement in capital cases a long and 
expensive prologue to the main event. Again, it is difficult to 
under.stand hew any state which has capital punishment could 
justify supporting section 8 or virtually any part of HR 4737. 
8. Sect ion 9--This provision appears to soften Rose v. 
Lundy. It permits dismissal of non-exhausted claims but 
does not re qui re dismissal. When one couples this with the 
proposed changes in the retroact i vi ty and procedural default 
rules, section 9 would perrni t capital habeas litigation to be 
conducted in a piecemeal fashion . It would make the process 
more confused and confusing than anyone can reasonably imagine 
at this point. 
Note that this section applies to all cases, capital and 
non-capital. 
C. Conclusion 
HR 4737 is a bill that reforms habeas corpus generally. It 
is not limited to capital c ases. It is the ideal approach to 
habeas carpus review if you are deeply skeptical of the way in 
which state criminal justice systems operate, It gives little 
finality or presumption of correctness even in non-capital cases 
and almost none in capital cas~s. If the skeptics are correct 
in their assessment of state criminal justice systems, then HR 
4737 should have been enacted long ago. If the states are 
unwilling to accept: the proffered challenge to the underlying 
fairness of thci r c riminal just ice systems, as they no doubt 
are, it is difficult to understand why HR 4737 was proposed. In 
states where capital punishment is not in force, one would have 
particular cause to wonder why this statute is needed. 
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III. Staff Meeting with Nunn and Graham Representatives 
On Monday, May 14, 1 990, I met wi'th representatives from 
the staffs of Senators Nunn and Graham. They are working on a 
compromise based on the Biden bill. Senator Graham is quite 
eager to get some type of habeas corpus reform legislation 
passed. Essentially, he is willing to go along with the Biden 
bill if the procedural default rule in it is deleted. The trade 
off is that Senator Graham would support a provision worded 
almost exactly like section 6 of HR 4737 overruling 
Teague v. Lane. lt is hard to understand why Senator Graham 
views this as a compromise since the " new law 11 argument often 
provides an arguable basis for showing "cause" under 
Wainwright v. Sykes. In any event , Sena tor Graham finds some 
kind of cquivalcncy that eludes me. 
Senator Graham disliked the Ad Hoc Committee report 1 s 
refusal to allow second petitions challenging the sentence 
determination. His staff . person appeared to understand what I 
said in explanation of the Ad Hoc Commi ttce position, but he 
believed that Senator Graham would never accept it as an 
adequate rationale. To Senator Graham, it makes the system look 
like it is willing to send persons to their fate while ignoring 
potentially valid arguments against the imposition of capital 
punishment in particular cases. 
IV. Other Reform Options 
I 1 ist here some additional steps that would improve the 
fairness of capital litigation at the front end and have the 
additional benefit of making federal review more effective and 
final when it occurs: 
1. Establish discovery rules in capital cases that would 
give capital defense litigators access to the prosecutor's files 
or designated portions of th~m in advance of trial. Include in 
this the right under designated circumstances to depose 
witnesses in c apit.al cases. 
2. Establish immunity rules under which a capital litigant 
can obtain the testimony of individuals who might have favorable 
infor·mation but would otherwise be exposed to possible self-
incrimination. 
J. Make mental and physical examinations of the defendant 
mandatory in all cases in which capital punishment is sought. 
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4- Require more liberal discovery in both 
federal po st convl c tion proceedings so that 
undiscovered evidence that might give rise to 




5- Require states to make more liberal use of foreign jury 
panels in ca!-ieS where the community climate for a trial is 
potentially inflamed. 
6. Provide sufficient federal funding so that the states 
can develop schemes of representation in capital cases that meet 
congressional standards. 
IV. Conclus i.on 
This overview became more detailed than I had originally 
intended. Please call me or have Hew Pate call me for further 
discussion if that would be helpful to you. I intend to arrive 
early enough on Wednesday, May 23, 1990 to be available for a 
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Su on ~ 
 
Courts, thank you for allowing me to appear today to 
testify on the important subject of habeas 
~ --~~~~~r;J~*~rl-(_q;z:-'~~ 
cases. As you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee o 
Judicial Conference that was formed to study this topic. 









Committee and our statutory proposal to the Congre ~ Aa e f3E:i;t 
is now embodied in a bill to-hat ~ beeA introduced by Sena-
tor Thurmond.fr f you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, I 
request that both our Committee Report, and the written ver-
sion of my testimony today, be made part of the formal 
record of this hearing. 
I am pleased to see that Congress is taking renewed 
interest in the subject of habeas corpus. It is appropriate 
that it should do so. Al though habeas corpus is a legal 






rights, the procedure itself is not required or controlled 
by the Constitution. c,t7 "Habeas corpus" is mentioned in the 
Constitution, but that is a reference to the ancient writ of 
habeas corpus available to challenge executive detention 
without trial. The procedures we discuss today, in con-
~ 
trast, were created by 1867. Congress is of 
course free to alter them. 
) ~ ~-L~ s ~ 
{ Our system o dual collateral review of criminal con-
victions is unique in the world. There are no time limits 
whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may challenge a 
conviction years after it has become final, and after wit-
nesses and records are long gone. Nor is there any res 
judicata. Claims may be brought again and again. Neither 
the Constitution nor common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee is a limited one. 
It is aimed specifically at the single area where the prob-
lems presented by unlimited habeas corpus litigation are 
most acute -- in capital cases. 
~ VLk 1-o 5 z 2 s l/-
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propriate for capital cases because the incentives in these 
cases are exactly the opposite of those involving imprison-
ment. The prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have 
his case reviewed speedily in the hope of gaining release. 
For the condemned inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 
It is important to emphasize the extensive procedures 
::S-.,L-~ 
that would remain in place under our proposal. A defendant 
/\ 
judge and a jury in a bifurcated 
:=i L k~__, 
to a full appeal in the state 
k ~~ o/ 
would.,..__)awe,- ~ 
1../-£.~/\ 
proceedd ') then proceed 
supreme court, followed by a petition for ce r tiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court. He would then r eturn to state 
trial court, supreme court, and the Supreme Court again in 
state collateral proceedings .1/ Next,~ 
~ 
~d~G ~d-~ G..., 
f e a e r a 1 di st r i ct ---A.~ 
,) ~~ ,to 4... //4~ ~ 
judge \ three judge \ court of appeals _panel, and A~ rt 
a..- ~d_ 11--3.k..~ ft:n'-- CL-v+ ~ 1-fu.-~ ~f 
....._ pe-t:4-t,-i-o-n-he-ise.'f/ During all of this time, an automatic stay 
of execution would remain in place so that judicial review 
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f~ e-judge state supreme court, the prisoner would at the 
t\ 
;2_/ 
end of the process have had review by at least ..1-:9' judges. 
In light of this fact, comments to the effect that our sys-
~ 
tern represents a II rush to judgment II arer ;1 responsible. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. About 20,000 murders are com-
mitted in our country each year. Only a fraction of the 
worst murderers -- even those convicted -- are sentenced to 
~ 
die. There are now approximately 2, ~ 00 convicted murderers 
on death row awaiting execution. Since the Supreme Court's 
7 
, 
1972 Furman decision only 128 executions have taken place. 
~r CA Jl · 
N-,v ty The 
~-£L~J.J-
H ~ has 
average length of time between conviction and execution 
been approximately eight years. Delay of this magnitude 
is hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough review. 
I~ The Bu--l~ objective of our proposal is this: Capital cases 
should be subject to one fair and complete course of collat-
era! review through the state and federal systems. This 








execution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for 
the prisoner. When th i s review has con c 1 u de d , 1 i ti g at i O n 
should end. 
/~,., ~ ~~ t .. J ;pt L-><-~ ,d.,LL»--{ -
It is vital to understand that our proposal is option-
al. It would not be binding on a State. It would allow a 
State to elect to bring collateral litigation involving its 
capital prisoners within the scope of the new federal stat-
ute. A State could do this by providing competent counsel 
in state post-conviction review . 
The proposal would reduce unnecessary delay by provid-
ing a time limit on the filing of federal habeas petitions. 
The time limit would have tolling rules that ensure ample 
time for the presentation and consideration of all claims. 
But reducing delay is not in itself the c hief goal of our 
proposal. Rather, it seeks to eliminate the legal chaos 
~ s r~~ 
caused by the lack of ff limitations perio~ k ~ m~ prisoners 
through the review system in an orderly and meticulous way . 
- 6 -
• The goal is not to cut off claims, but to see that they are brought forward for early resolution. 
The Committee's proposal would enhance finality by lim-
iting the circumstances in which federal relief may be 
0 ~- sought ~-µ,, 
? court. 
after one full course of litigation up to the Supreme 
The proposal would strictly limit subsequent and 
successive petitions. That is, after having one full and 
fair course of review, a prisoner should not be allowed to 
return to court again and again to seek delay . 
• The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners: competent 
counsel, an automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner 
need not engage in separate stay 1 it i ga ti on to have his 
claim heard, and a new automatic right of appeal from the 









In sum, the purpose of the Cammi t tee's proposal is to 
advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system --
fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current 
habeas corpus law have been introduced since our Committee 
filed its report. I comment briefly on these, particularly 
Senator Biden's bill, S. 1757, and the House bill recently 
introduced by Chairman Kastenmeier, H.R. 4737. These bills 
purport to aim for "reform" of habeas corpus. I regret that 
I must say they would have the opposite effect. Both of 
these bi 11 s would leave the capital habeas corpus sys tern 
. ) . . ~~~ 
~- ~~~··~ """...- ...,_ y J V ,\ 






q~ v~ , 
proposals would mean support for $.-&£..e ~  piecemeal 4:it-'12¥.lSis.t,J 
ye-c..-~~I 
litigation, ~and more last minute appeals. 
\ 
~ /3 '-,J.l.k_. 13 J..t._, 
~ irst on the significant diffe r ence between 
~ 
t he--~ proposals. 
) 5,17'57; 
Senator Biden's bill is modeled in 
I\ 
structure on our Committee's proposal, though its content is 
quite different. The States would have the option of using 
the new system , c · l. ~ oq, t, e::h e 
12,___,_ ~ ~'1~ a..- st-~ Lv 
St~<\ pro~ ide competent counsel for state collateral 1 
review, which is not required by the Constitution , an d 1,JG u ld .l----
~ ~ ~ ~ 
automatic stay of execution for one trip 
through the state and federal systems .1/ In return, the 
w- ~~ ~ d-~~ 
States r,ould j rnte.,g s of finality once t-R-9< 
~ f 1· ' . course o 1t1gat1on was complete. fJik, y c,rnc.ec o wi th t h-e Bi-
-'\ ff I.,,._, f- \ 
d e-FlrlEH-ti:-.--S;_,,_.--l-P..0--.,.........i-ls---t:-t're:-t ; the fin a 1 i t y prov i s ions are so 
v'\ 
weakened, and the counsel provisions so mu c h more complex 
~ '-i-~ 
and burdensome, that At-M States would ~ opt to use the new 





ty for reform, and a new statute that would lay on the books 
unused. ,~ 
1 ~ 4~ l<aA-~~ ~ -r J;; H.R. 4737 contains many of the same 
-"' ,It, l 5) -f /.J.-, 
provisions that 
weaken finality. A-R-d II.R. <HJ..:7 '...s. provision setting forth 
/'I 
standards for counsel appointments are even more complex and 
burdensome than those of the Biden plan. But the difference 
is that H.R. 4737 is not optional. Rather, H.R. 4737 makes 
I 
(AA... 
sweeping and mandatory changes t.o the federal habeas stat-
~ 
H_fo~ ~ 
utes .i.."lA favor r convicted murderers in all cases. // Unlike 
the proposal of our Committee, which attempts to balance the 
need for finality with the need for procedural protection, 
H.R. 4737 proposes a radical revision of the habeas co r pus ~-statutes and overruling of Supreme Court cases, all to ~~e 
"' 
it more difficult to carry out capital sentences. rl I will 
now discuss briefly the particular provisions that give me 
cause for concern. As I have said, roughly equivalent pro-
visions appear in both S. 1757, with the major difference 





I comment first on the provisions for appointment of 
counsel. Our committee made the judgment that the initial 
judgment about appropriate standards for the appointment of 
counsel should be made within the individual States, where 
officials are familiar with local needs, conditions, and 
k~· 
resources. H.R. 4737 and S. 1757 impose uniform mandatory 
I'\ 
standards for appointment and competence. I applaud the 
~ these provisions, which is to assure high quality 
counsel.1/My concern is that the provisions in S. 1757 may 
~l-1-c 
be so burdensome and expensive that States would not Q.P-t.cJ.n 
..-1 
~ ~ c:t. 
t o--Hte-ftew syst.e.m. H.R. 4737 provides even more complex and 
burdensome requirements, but makes them mandatory. ~ 
L ~/:;/; ~~b ~ ~de~~s~ 
"\ 
that s+•y commands states to legislate a program and then 
b 
spend State funds in support of it. 17This is not the way 
federal legislation usually works in our constitutional sys-
~ 




- 11 - {~,~. 
~~~ 
counsel / 1coul~ _,e_y~-- ~ _f_QJJnd- t -o-· meet theL 
/ l_,/ ) 
reme~~f H.R. 4737. 
~ 
I next mention the problem of 
8~~11 ~.9 ~~ 
repetitive petitions. 
/\the t.W@-1s tcrcut-es ~would severely weaken t.h e part of the habe-
as statute aimed at limiting multipl e , r epetitive habeas 
petitions. Instead of placing limits on multiple filings 
after the first full course of 
l,4iJ. s . t7S"? ~ ti.~- '-l-"7'37 
1 i tiga tion 'I\ t r~al 
would make multiple appeals mo r e readily available. f7 As I 
have said before, after the full course of r eview under ou r 
Committee's proposal, a prisone r would hav e had r eview by a 
~ J_ l 
jury and at least l,-9' judges. We the r efo re believe it would 
"\ 
; ~""-¼_ ~/-<_rf~,1 










c-,.._ ~ ~ -l-v--i.4_ 
/( ~ question of factual innocence of the c r ime. /4 I1":'"R'7=" 4737, 
~ 1,/ . ,If, . 4 -, '3 7 ~ ~ 4_ 
~ -a-t-e-F----B+cl-e-A-1-s S . 1 7 ~ A C:aa n g e a- til-e p-i.=-~i s i o R.---t-e al l-ew 
limitless new challenges to the "appropriate ness" of the 
capital sentence4/The problem with this vague ly worded p r o-
vision is that every new claim p r esented in a capital casfl/ 
is a claim that the sentence is ~ e. The effect 
• 
- 12 - tt,~~ 
------~~!~ 
of this provision would be to allow limitless appeals 
~ :s'i:Di~ / O ~ 
wo r:-s..e -
ryt»SC &LC st-,x;Jtd-,, ~ ~ <:!~k-e_ ~ ~ 
t ·~ r the pre sen: system~ whe r e single~ prisoners often 
come before the Supreme Court of the United States five, 
six, or seven times. 
t 4,.,.1 : 
9 /LJ ~ H.R. 4737 does provide, at least in theory, for a limi-
~ i/rf..-7 _ tations period to move cases through the system. But in-
~ stead of the six month p r ovision recommended by our Commit-
<fl 
tee, the period is extended in H.R. 4737 to one year. Mo r e 11; 
important, the limitations period does not apply at all 
• where a prisoner presents a "colorable claim 
of ... ineligibility for a capital sentence" not previously 
presented. But as I have stated above, almost any claim in 
a capital case could fit this desc ri ption. The result is 
that H.R. 4737 appears to provide a needed limitations peri-
od, but provides no time limit at all, and no incentive to a 
prisoner to bring his claims promptly. 
I note also that H.R. 4737 , provides for an automatic 





Our Committee believed that such an automatic stay is desir-
able, provided other limits on repetition and delay are in 
place. H.R. 4737 provides the automatic stay, but no limits 
on delay and repetition. The prospect under H.R. 4737 is 
~ 
that prisoners CwR- continue to delay and file repeat peti-
~ 
tions, ~ ~ ction of an automatic stay of exe -
~ 
cution without ~ making a showing that their claims have 
merit. 
I do note one area in which H.R. 4737 appears to be 
superior to s. 1757. This 
~ vt.... ~ f- ito 
is t.l:J.9 a r ea e f procedural de-
"'--
fault. The law of procedural default simply provides that a 
defendant must raise a claim of error at trial, when correc-
tions may be made, and not years late r when evidence may 
have gone stale. H.R. 4737, although some what ambiguous, 
appears to codify the present law stated in Supreme Court 
cases. f/ s. 1757, however, would overrule a whole series of 
Supreme Court cases and hold that defaulted claims may be 




neglect of the lawyer or the prisoner. This provision would 
essentially do away with the rules of procedural default, 
and provide a dangerous incentive for prisoners to withhold 
claims so that they could be presented later for purposes of 
delay. 
~~ ~At 
one final area of great importance, that of 
~ 
retroactivity. The Supreme Court's cases hold that the le-
gality of a prisoner's conviction and sentence should be 
judged on the basis of the law as it existed at the time of 
his original trial and appeal. This view, first taken by 
the late Justice Harlan, rep re sen ts the c ommon sense idea 
that a prisoner should not be able, years after the fact, to 
challenge his sentence on the basis of law that was not ~ 
on the books at the time of his crime, trial or appeal. 
Cf! H.R. 4737 and S. 1757 would reverse these Supreme Court 
~~ 
cases, and make it far easier for prisoners to ~t their 
~~~ .$Z..~-
- !g ii-$&:],-
convictions It would be unfortunate for the 
• I~ ,; ~.L--<.. (AA- ~ 7/1A~ . 
✓· / 9 ~ 1,.-v' ~_.u)., ~ T-<--~1 l.,L.f3 ~I~ ----.. 
l 
• 
- 15 - lA-- c. c: ... /uJ~ c~ 
~~f ~:t ~~ 
• 
recent interest in habeas reform to be the occasion for) / ll ~~ 
} . ~ 
~
I now conclude briefly. I do not exaggerate when I say 
that a vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be a 
vote to eliminate capital punishment in the United States. 
I respect those who argue for the abolition of the death 
penalty. If I were a legislator I would vote against capi-
tal punishment . ~f. But I see little sense in keeping 
the penalty, but adopting measures that would exacerbate the 
• ~f-"'1 already chaotic situation that frustrates the Apeoa Jtv' s;;!d_ 
m ~ /4._g__ -e.~ t>--f 3 7 S-~ 








Retroactivity.The Ad Hoc Committee Report does not alter 
present law with respect to the retroactivity of new rule of 
criminal law. The Biden Bill, the ABA Task Force, and Judge 
Lay's group propose overruling Supreme Court precedent to make 
retroactivity rules more favorable to capital inmates. 
Comment. Under the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 
(1989), a new rule of criminal procedure will 
not be applied retroactively on federal habe-
as unless the new rule places an entire cate-
gory of conduct or defendants beyond the 
reach of the law, or the new rule is "implic-
it in ordered liberty." This current retro-
activity law correctly reflects that federal 
habeas corpus should serve as a vehicle to 
correct errors in state judgment. It should 
not serve as a forum to argue for new rules 
of law, which would then be applied to over-
turn state court judgments that were correct 
at the time they were decided. No principle 
of justice or fairness is served by allowing 
a defendant to challenge his conviction on 
the basis of law that was not on the books at 
the time of his crime, trial, or appeal. As 
the Supreme Court, citing Judge Friendly, 
stated in Teague, "Application of constitu-
tional rules not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously undermines 
the principle of finality which is essential 
to the operation of our criminal justice sys-
tem." 109 S. Ct., at 1074. Retroactivity is 
an area that has been traditionally handled 
by the courts, not by legislation. The pro-
posed statutory change s in retroactivity 
under the Biden, ABA, and Lay proposals will 
also worsen the present situation with re-
spect to finality and federal state re lations 
in the area of capital h abeas corpus without 







Procedural Default. The Ad Hoc Committee Report does not 
propose any alteration of the present law with respect to proce-
dural default. The Biden, ABA, and Lay proposals, however, pro-
pose dramatic alteration of this entire area of the law. 
Comment. The Biden, ABA, and Lay pro-
posals would, under various formulations, 
require that federal courts ignore state pro-
cedural default rules any time the failure to 
raise a claim was due to "ignorance or ne-
glect" of the prisoner or counsel. These 
proposals would overrule by legislation Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and the 
entire line of cases that follows it. State 
procedural default rules serve the valid pur-
pose of requiring objections to be raised at 
trial, when corrective measures can be taken, 
not years later in a federal habeas petition. 
This drastic action would again promote delay 
and piecemeal litigation. Add i tion of this 
provision to any reform package would make 
its passage less likely, and eliminate any 
incentive for the States to support it. 
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Testimony of Justice Lewis F . Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
May 24, 1990, 9:30 a.m. 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House 
Subcommittee on Courts, thank you for allowing me 
to appear here today/to testify on the important 
subject of habeas corpus in capital cases. As you 
know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Judicial Conference / that was formed to study this 
topic. 
I 
With me this morning are Professor Al 
Pearson,/who served as Reporter for our Committee,/ 
and Hewitt Pate,/ who was my Law Clerk during the 
Committee's work. 
The Chief Justice has transmitted to the 
Congress the full Report of our Committee and our 
statutory proposal. It is now e mbodied in a bill 
introduced by Senator Thurmond, S. 1760.'[/If you 
think it appropriate Mr. Chairman,/1 _r:..!q.!;est that 
both our Committee Report,/and the !£!~~en version 
of my testimony today,/be made part of the fo rmal 
record of this hearing. 
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Judicial Conference Amendment to my 
Committee's Proposal 
In September the Judicial Conference 
considered the proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee, 
and approved all of them except for two amendments 
as follows: 
1. The Conference endorsed more detailed 
standards for the appointment of counsel in 
capital cases, based on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988. 
2. The Conference endorsed an amendment 
similar, to the provision in the Biden Bill and 
Kastenmeier's Bill, that would weaken the 
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Subcommittee on Courts, 
thank you for allowing me to appear here today to testify on the 
important subject of habeas corpus in capital cases. As you 
know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Commit tee of the Judicial Conference 
that was formed to study this topic. 1/with me this morning are 
Professor Al Pearson, who served as Reporter for our Committee, 
and Hewitt Pate, who was my Law Clerk during the Committee's 
work. 
The Chief Justice has transmitted the full Report of our 
Committee and our statutory proposal to the Congress. It is now 
embodied in a bill introduced by Senator Thurmond, S. 1760. If 
you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, I request that both our 
Committee Report, and the written version of my testimony today, 
be made part of the formal record of this hearing. 
-,--, d.~ 
I be~y-....st4ljn~t the present~ system of collateral re -
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prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned in-
mate, whose innocence is rarely in question, delay is the ove r-
riding objective. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not being 
enforced by the courts. While the r e a r e app r oximately 20,000 
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convicted murderers are sentenced to death. r/The r e a r e now ap-
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tions have taken place.1/ The average len9th of time between con-
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The objective of the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee e-r--
Federal Habeas Corpus ia- C-a13ital Cei.€e.s that I c haired is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fai r and complete cours e 
of collateral review through the state and federal systems . This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending exe-
cution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for the 
prisoner. fjwhen this review has concluded, litigation should end, 
absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question of factual 
innocence. 
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Our proposal wouldA allow a State to elect to b r ing 
collateral litigation involving its capital prisoners within the 
- 3 -
scope of a new federal statute. A State could do this by provid-
ing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
I~ The purpose of the Committee's proposal is to ad-
vance the fundamental requirement of a justice system fair-
ness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness means a 
searching and impartial review of the propriety of the sentence. 
1J Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's claims are found to 
be without merit, society is entitled to have a lawful penalty 
carried out without unreasonable delay. 
It is important to emphasize the extensive procedures that 
would remain in place under our proposal. Assuming a seven-judge 
state supreme court, the prisoner would at the end of the process 
have had review by at least 21 judges. ?7 rn light of this fact, 
comments to the effect that our proposal represents a "rush to 
judgment" are irresponsible. 
,t: 'l( ~ V 
A number of e OfflfHi: ±-n,g proposals for changes in current habe-
as corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed its 
report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five proposed 
amendments to our Committee's proposa1.f/ Senator Biden's s. 1757 
and Chairman Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" 
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optional with the States, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and man-
datory changes in the federal habeas statutes that favor convict -
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v In brief summary l the two pending bills present several rea-
sons for concern. They impose requirements for the appointment 
of counsel that appear to be too complex and expensive for them 
to have a realistic chance for state support.fi r agree with the 
general aim of these provisions, which is to assure the provision 
of high quality counsel. But we must recognize the reality of 
financial and other local limitations. 
The two bills would eliminate the protections our proposal 
sought to provide against repetitive habeas corpus petitions. 
Prisoners now often file three, four, or more petitions to delay 
their executions. But both S. 1757 and H.R. 4737 would
1
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allow further challenges based on new law not ~ on the books 
at the time the conviction became final . 
In short, a vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be 
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, thank you for allowing me to appear here today to 
testify on the important subject of habeas corpus in capital 
cases. As you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Commit tee of the 
Judicial Conference that was formed to study this topic. 
With me this morning are Professor Al Pearson, who served as 
Reporter for our Committee, and Hewitt Pate, who was my Law 
Clerk during the Committee's work. The Chief Justice has 
transmitted the full Report of our Committee and our statu-
tory proposal to the Congress. It is now embodied in a bill 
introduced by Senator Thurmond, s. 1760. If you think it 
appropriate Mr. Chairman, I request that both our Committee 
Report, and the written version of my testimony today, be 
made part of the formal record of this hearing. 
I am pleased to see that Congress is taking renewed 
interest in the subject of habeas corpus. It is appropriate 
that it should do so. Although habeas corpus is a legal 
procedure that allows prisoners to assert constitutional 
rights, the procedure i tse 1 f is not re qui red or control led 
by the Constitution. "Habeas corpus" is mentioned in the 
Constitution, but that is a reference to the ancient writ of 
habeas corpus available to challenge executive detention 
without trial. The procedures we discuss today, in con-
trast, were created by Congress in 1867, and are now codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §2254. Congress is of course free to 
alter them. 
The Present Situation 
Our system of dual collateral review of criminal con-
victions is unique in the world. There are no serious time 
limits on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may challenge a con-
viction long after it has become final, and after witnesses 
and records are long gone. Nor is there any res judicata. 
Petitions may be brought again and again. Neither the Con-
stitution nor common sense supports this. The problems pre-
sented by unlimited habeas corpus litigation are most acute 
in capital cases. Separate procedures are appropriate for 
capital cases because the incentives in these cases are ex-
actly the opposite of those involving imprisonment. The 
prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have his case re-
viewed speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the 
condemned inmate, whose innocence is rarely in question, 
delay is the overriding objective. 
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The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. About 20,000 murders are com-
mitted in our country each year. Only a fraction of the 
worst murderers -- even those convicted -- are sentenced to 
die. There are now approximately 2,300 convicted murderers 
on death row awaiting execution. Since the Supreme Court's 
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), only 128 
executions have taken place. The ave rage length of time 
between conviction and execution has been approximately 
eight years. Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary 
for fairness or for thorough review. 
The Objective of Our Proposal 
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital cases 
should be subject to one fair and complete course of collat-
eral review through the state and federal systems. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending 
execution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for 
the prisoner. When this review has concluded, 1 i tiga tion 
should end, absent extraordinary circumstances raising a 
question of factual innocence. Our proposal is optional, 
and would not be binding on a State. This approach accords 
appropriate respect to the States as independent uni ts of 
government in our federal system. Our proposal would allow 
a State to elect to bring collateral litigation involving 
its capital prisoners within the scope of a new federal 
statute. A State could do this by providing competent coun-
sel in state post-conviction review. 
It is important to emphasize the extensive procedures 
that would remain in place under our proposal. A state de-
fendant would be tried by a judge and jury in a bifurcated 
proceeding. He would then proceed to a full appeal in the 
state supreme court, followed by a petition for certiorari 
in the United States Supreme Court. He could then return to 
state trial court and state supreme court for collateral 
proceedings. Next, the prisoner could file a habeas corpvs 
petition in federal district court, and appeal to a three 
judge federal court of appeals panel. His case might then 
be reviewed by the full en bane court of appeals and another 
petition for certiorari would be filed in the Supreme Court. 
During all of this time, an automatic stay of execution 
would remain in place so that judicial review would take 
place free from time pressure, regardless of the merits of 
the prisoner's claim or any issue of factual innocence. As-
suming a seven-judge state supreme court, the prisoner would 
at the end of the process have had review by at least 21 
judges. In light of this fact, comments to the effect that 
our proposal represents a "rush to judgment" are irresponsi-
ble. 
Our proposal would reduce unnecessary delay by provid-
ing a time limit on the filing of federal habeas petitions. 
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At the present time, the absence of a limitations period 
means that the setting of an execution date provides the 
only incentive for a prisoner to move litigation forward. 
The proposed time limit would have tolling rules that ensure 
ample time for the presentation and consideration of all 
claims. Our proposal seeks to eliminate the legal chaos 
caused by the lack of a limitations period that serves to 
move prisoners through the review system in an orderly way. 
The goal is not to cut off claims, but to see that they are 
brought forward for early resolution. 
The Committee's proposal would enhance finality, as 
well as fairness, by limiting the circumstances in which 
federal relief may be sought after one full course of liti-
gation through the federal and state systems and to the 
Supreme Court. The proposal would strictly limit subsequent 
and successive petitions. That is, after having one full 
course of review, a prisoner should not be allowed to return 
to court again and again to seek delay, in the absence of an 
issue of factual innocence. The reduction of unnecessary 
repetition, increased order, and enhanced finality, are the 
benefits to a State that adopts our proposal. But a State 
would have to provide increased safeguards for the rights of 
pr i saner s: competent counsel in state collateral proceed-
ings, an automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner 
need not engage in separate stay litigation to have his 
claim heard, and a new automatic right of appeal from the 
federal district court to the federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is to 
advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also ~ equires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current 
habeas corpus law have been introduced since our Committee 
filed its report, and the Judicial Conference approved two 
of five proposed amendments to our Committee's proposal. I 
comment briefly on the pending legislation, particularly 
Senator Biden' s bill, S. 1757, and the House bill recently 
introduced by Chairman Kastenmeier, H.R. 4737. These bills 
purport to aim for "reform" of habeas corpus. I regret that 
I must say they would have the opposite ef feet. Both of 
these bills would leave the capital habeas corpus system in 
greater disarray than under present law. In short, support 
for these proposals would mean support for increased delay, 
piecemeal litigation, and more last minute appeals. 
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Sen. Biden's Bill 
Senator Biden's bill, S. 1757, is modeled in structure 
on our Committee's proposal, though its content is quite 
different. The States would have the option of using the 
new system, bu t would be required to provide counsel 
throughout the entire course of proceedings according to an 
exacting federal standard, and to accept an automatic stay 
of execution for one course of review. In return, the 
States should expect added guarantees of finality once the 
course of litigation was complete. But the finality provi-
sions of s. 1757 are so weakened, and the counsel provisions 
so complex and expensive, that few if any of the States 
would opt to use the new system. The unfortunate result 
would be a missed opportunity for reform, and a new statute 
that would lay on the books unused. 
Rep. Kastenmeier's Bill 
H.R. 4737 contains many of the same provisions that 
weaken finality. Its standards for counsel appointments are 
even more complex and burdensome than those of Sen. Biden's 
plan. But the difference is that H.R. 4737 is not optional. 
Rather, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and mandatory changes 
in the federal habeas statutes that favor convicted crimi-
nals both in capital and noncapital cases. Unlike the pro-
posal of our Committee, which attempts to balance the need 
for finality with the need for procedural protection, H.R. 
4737 proposes a radical revision of the habeas corpus stat-
utes and overruling of Supreme Court cases, all making it 
more difficult to uphold criminal convictions or to carry 
out capital sentences. 
*** 
Several provisions that appear in one or both of these 
bills present cause for concern. As I have said, several 
roughly equivalent provisions appear in both bills, with the 
major difference that the H.R. 4737 provisions are manda-
tory. 
Counsel Appointment Standards 
Our committee made the judgment that the initial judg-
ment about appropriate standards for the appointment of 
counsel should be made within the individual States, where 
officials are familiar with local needs, conditions, and 
resources. H.R. 4737 ands. 1757 both impose uniform manda-
tory standards for appointment and competence. I applaud 
the purpose of these provisions, which is to assure high 
quality counsel. My concern is that the provisions in s. 
1757 may be so burdensome and expensive that States would 
elect not to comply with them. 
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H.R. 4737 provides even more complex and burdensome 
requirements. But this proposal would not be optional with 
the States. Ra the r, States a re simply commanded to leg is-
late elaborate schemes for provision of counsel through the 
entire course of every capital case. If the State fails to 
do this, neither state procedural rules nor state court 
findings of fact would be honored by the federal habeas 
court as required by current law. I doubt that Congress 
knowingly would approve a statute that simply commands 
States to legislate a program and then spend state funds in 
support of it. This is not the way federal legislation usu-
ally works in our constitutional system. The counsel stand-
ards of H.R. 4737 are so burdensome that I doubt any state 
legislature would enact them. The effect of H.R. 4737 would 
then be to eliminate by statute respect for state procedural 
rules, and to provide by statute that state court findings 
of fact should be ignored. This result suggests a disturb-
ing lack of respect for state courts and judges. 
I agree with those who say that the fairness of capital 
litigation would be enhanced by the provision of better 
counsel at the early stages of capital litigation, especial-
ly at trial. This is just one aspect of the general need in 
the United States for quality legal assistance for those who 
are unable to afford it. In an era of budget deficits and 
scarce resources, however, it is not realistic to assume 
that Congress may simply decree that States shall provide 
counsel and state funding under rigid mandatory require-
ments. Our Committee tried to assess the situation realis-
tically, and to give the States an incentive to provide 
counsel in one area where it is not required at all -- at 
the state postconviction stage. I continue to believe our 
approach is a constructive one. 
Repetitive Habeas Corpus Petitions 
Both of the bills I am addressing would severely weaken 
the part of the habeas statute aimed at limiting multiple, 
repetitive habeas petitions. Instead of placing limits on 
multiple filings after the first full course of litigation, 
H.R. 4737 and S. 1757 would make multiple reviews more 
readily available. As I have said before, after the full 
course of review under our Committee's proposal, a prisoner 
would have had review by a jury and at least 21 judges. We 
therefore believe it would be fair and in the interest of 
justice to bar further review unless there is an unresolved 
question of factual innocence of the crime. Under both H.R. 
4737 ands. 1757, there could be limitless new challenges to 
the "appropriateness" of the capital sentence. The problem 
with this vaguely worded provision is that every new claim 
presented in a capital cases is a claim that the sentence is 
"inappropriate." The effect of this provision would be to 
allow limitless appeals, a system less rational than the 
present one, under which single capital case prisoners often 
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come before the Supreme Court of the United States oncer-
tiorari five or more times. 
Time Limits and Automatic Stay 
H.R. 4737 does provide, at least in theory, for a limi-
tations period to move cases through the system. But in-
stead of the six month provision recommended by our Commit-
tee, the period is extended in H.R. 4737 to one year. More 
important, the limitations period does not apply at all 
where a prisoner presents a "colorable claim of ... ineligi-
bi 1 i ty for a capital sentence" not previously presented. 
But as I have stated above, almost any claim in a capital 
case could fit this description. The result is that H.R. 
4737 appears to provide a needed limitations period, but 
provides no real time limit, and no incentive to a prisoner 
to bring his claims promptly. I note also that H.R. 4737 
provides for an automatic stay of execution while a prison-
er's claims are pending. Our Committee believes that such 
an automatic stay is desirable, provided other limits on 
repetition and delay are in place. H.R. 4737 provides the 
automatic stay, but no limits on delay and repetition. The 
prospect under H.R. 4737 is that prisoners can continue to 
delay and file repeat petitions, yet gain the protection of 
an automatic stay of execution without even making a showing 
that their claims have merit. 
Procedural Default 
Both of the alternative bills also would change the law 
of procedural default. The law of procedural default re-
quires that a defendant must raise claims of error at trial, 
when corrections may be made, not years later when the only 
course would be a new trial or sentencing. Some have argued 
that rules of procedural default unfairly allow prisoners to 
forfeit meritorious claims due to the mistakes of their law-
yers. But under current law, procedural default will not 
apply where a lawyer is shown to be incompetent. And with-
out procedural default rules, a capital prisoner has a 
strong incentive to withhold claims for later litigation in 
an effort to produce delay. The language of H.R. 4737 is 
somewhat ambiguous, and differs from that of S. 1757. But 
S. 1757 in clear terms, and apparently H.R. 4737 as well, 
would overrule a series of Supreme Court cases on the law of 
procedural default. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 
478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). This would make it more dif-
ficult for States to defend convictions and sentences from 
attack in a federal habeas court. 
Exhaustion of State Remedies 
Federal law now requires that before claims may be as-
serted in a federal habeas corpus petition, they must first 
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be presented to state courts. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 
509 (1982). This represents appropriate respect for feder-
alism -- a state court system should have an opportunity to 
address any errors on its own before intrusion by the feder-
al system. H.R. 4737 appears to alter current law and to 
weaken the exhaustion requirement. Where a prisoner has 
exhausted only some of his claims, he would be allowed to 
present these claims to federal court in a first federal 
petition. If he had other unexhausted claims, H.R. 4737 
would give the prisoner a right to litigate those in state 
court, and then return to federal court for a second federal 
petition as a matter of right. This approach would promote 
piecemeal litigation. 
Retroactivity 
I mention ooe final area of great importance, that of 
retroactivity. The Supreme Court's cases hold that the le-
gality of a prisoner's conviction and sentence should be 
judged on the basis of the law as it existed at the time of 
his original trial and appeal. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. 
Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 
109 s. Ct. 1060 (1989). This view, first taken by the late 
Justice Harlan, represents the common sense idea that a 
prisoner should not be able, years after the fact, to chal-
lenge his sentence on the basis of law that was not on the 
books at the time of his crime, trial or appeal. H.R. 4737 
and S. 1757 would reverse these Supreme Court cases, and 
make it far easier for prisoners to upset their convictions 
in this way. I note that the Judicial Conference voted to 
reject a proposed amendment to our Report that would have 
had the same effect. It would be unfortunate for the recent 
interest in habeas reform to be the occasion for further 
years of delay in capital and other cases by prisoners using 
habeas corpus for continuing challenges to their conviction 
and sentence on the basis of changes in the law. 
Conclusion 
I do not exaggerate when I say that a vote for H.R. 
4737 would in practical effect be a vote to eliminate capi-
tal punishment in the United States. S. 1757 as well would 
leave the situation at least as bad as it is now. I respect 
those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty. If 
I were a legislator I would vote against capital punishment. 
But I see little sense in keeping the penalty, but adopting 
measures that would exacerbate the already chaotic situation 
that frustrates enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
May 24, 1990. 
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, thank you for allowing me to appear he re today to 
testify on the important subject of habeas corpus in capit~l 
cases. As you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Cammi t tee of the 
Judicial Conference that was formed to study this topic. 
With me this morning are Professor Al Pearson, who served as 
Reporter for our Committee, and Hewitt Pate, who was my Law 
Clerk during the Committee's work. The Chief Justice has 
transmitted the full Report of our Committee and our statu-
tory proposal to the Congress. It is now embodied in a bill 
introduced by Senator Thurmond, S. 1760. If you think it 
appropriate Mr. Chairman, I request that both our Committee 
Report, and the written version of my testimony today, be 
made part of the formal record of this hearing. 
I am pleased to see that Congress is taking renewed 
interest in the subject of habeas corpus. It is appropriate 
that it should do so. Although habeas corpus is a legal 
procedure that allows prisoners to assert constitutional 
rights, the procedure itself is not required or controlled 
by the Constitution. "Habeas corpus" is mentioned in the 
Constitution, but that is a reference to the ancient writ of 
habeas corpus available to challenge executive detention 
with out trial. The procedures we discuss today, in con-
trast, were created by Congress in 1867, and are now codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §2254. Congress is of course free to 
alter them. 
The Present Situation 
Our system of dual collateral review of criminal con-
victions is unique in the world. There are no serious time 
limits on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may challenge a con-
viction long after it has become final, and after witnesses 
and records are long gone. Nor is there any res judicata. 
Petitions may be brought again and again. Neither the Con-
stitution nor common sense supports this. The problems pre-
sented by unlimited habeas corpus litigation are most acute 
in capital cases. Separate procedures a re appropriate for 
capital cases because the incentives in these cases are ex-
actly the opposite of those involving imprisonment. The 
prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have his case re-
viewed speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the 
condemned inmate, whose innocence is rarely in question, 
delay is the overriding objective. 
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The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. About 20,000 murders are com-
mitted in our country each year. Only a fraction of the 
worst murderers -- even those convicted -- are sentenced to 
die. There are now approximately 2,300 convicted murderers 
on death row awaiting execution. Since the Supreme Court's 
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), only 128 
executions have taken place. The ave rage length of time 
between conviction and execution has been approximately 
eight years. Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary 
for fairness or for thorough review. 
The Objective of Our Proposal 
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital cases 
should be subject to one fair and complete course of collat-
eral review through the state and federal sys terns. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending 
execution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for 
the prisoner. When this review has concluded, litigation 
should end, absent extraordinary circumstances raising a 
question of factual innocence. Our proposal is optional, 
and would not be binding on a State. This approach accords 
appropriate respect to the States as independent uni ts of 
government in our federal system. Our proposal would allow 
a State to elect to bring collateral litigation involving 
its capital prisoners within the scope of a new federal 
statute. A State could do this by providing competent coun-
sel in state post-conviction review. 
It is important to emphasize the extensive procedures 
that would remain in place under our proposal. A state de-
fendant would be tried by a judge and jury in a bifurcated 
proceeding. He would then proceed to a full appeal in the 
state supreme court, followed by a petition for certiorari 
in the United States Supreme Court. He could then return to 
state trial court and state supreme court for collateral 
proceedings. Next, the prisoner could file a habeas corpvs 
petition in federal district court, and appeal to a three 
judge federal court of appeals panel. His case might then 
be reviewed by the full en bane court of appeals and another 
petition for certiorari would be filed in the Supreme Court. 
During all of this time, an automatic stay of execution 
would remain in place so that judicial review would take 
place free from time pressure, regardless of the merits of 
the prisoner's claim or any issue of factual innocence. As-
suming a seven-judge state supreme court, the prisoner would 
at the end of the process have had review by at least 21 
judges. In light of this fact, comments to the effect that 
our proposal represents a "rush to judgment" are irresponsi-
ble. 
Our proposal would reduce unnecessary delay by provid-
ing a time limit on the filing of federal habeas petitions. 
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At the present time, the absence of a limitations period 
means that the setting of an execution date provides the 
only incentive for a prisoner to move litigation forward. 
The proposed time limit would have tolling rules that ensure 
ample time for the presentation and consideration of all 
claims. Our proposal seeks to eliminate the legal chaos 
caused by the lack of a limitations period that serves to 
move prisoners through the review system in an orderly way. 
The goal is not to cut off claims, but to see that they are 
brought forward for early resolution. 
The Committee's proposal would enhance finality, as 
well as fairness, by limiting the circumstances in which 
federal relief may be sought after one full course of liti-
gation through the federal and state systems and to the 
Supreme Court. The proposal would strictly limit subsequent 
and successive petitions. That is, after having one full 
course of review, a prisoner should not be allowed to return 
to court again and again to seek delay, in the absence of an 
issue of factual innocence. The reduction of unnecessary 
repetition, increased order, and enhanced finality, are the 
benefits to a State that adopts our proposal. But a State 
would have to provide increased safeguards for the rights of 
prisoners: competent counsel in state collateral proceed-
ings, an automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner 
need not engage in separate stay litigation to have his 
claim heard, and a new automatic right of appeal from the 
federal district court to the federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Commit tee's proposal is to 
advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, f ai rne ss 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current 
habeas corpus law have been introduced since our Committee 
filed its report, and the Judicial Conference approved two 
of five proposed amendments to our Committee's proposal. I 
comment briefly on the pending legislation, particularly 
Senator Biden's bill, S. 1757, and the House bill recently 
introduced by Chairman Kastenmeier, H.R. 4737. These bills 
purport to aim for "reform" of habeas corpus. I regret that 
I must say they would have the opposite effect. Both of 
these bills would leave the capital habeas corpus system in 
greater disarray than under present law. In short, support 
for these proposals would mean support for increased delay, 
piecemeal litigation, and more last minute appeals. 
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Sen. Biden's Bill 
Senator Biden's bill, s. 1757, is modeled in structure 
on our Cammi ttee' s proposal, though its content is quite 
different. The States would have the option of using the 
new system, but would be required to provide counsel 
throughout the entire course of proceedings according to an 
exacting federal standard, and to accept an automatic stay 
of execution for one course of review. In return, the 
States should expect added guarantees of finality once the 
course of litigation was complete. But the finality provi-
sions of S. 1757 are so weakened, and the counsel provisions 
so complex and expensive, that few if any of the States 
would opt to use the new system. The unfortunate result 
would be a missed opportunity for reform, and a new statute 
that would lay on the books unused. 
Rep. Kastenmeier's Bill 
H.R. 4737 contains many of the same provisions that 
weaken finality. Its standards for counsel appointments are 
even more complex and burdensome than those of Sen. Biden's 
plan. But the difference is that H.R. 4737 is not optional. 
Rather, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and mandatory changes 
in the federal habeas statutes that favor convicted crimi-
nals both in capital and noncapital cases. Unlike the pro-
posal of our Committee, which attempts to balance the need 
for finality with the need for procedural protection, H.R. 
4737 proposes a radical revision of the habeas corpus stat-
utes and overruling of Supreme Court cases, all making it 
more difficult to uphold criminal convictions or to carry 
out capital sentences. 
*** 
Several provisions that appear in one or both of these 
bills present cause for concern. As I have said, several 
roughly equivalent provisions appear in both bills, with the 
major difference that the H.R. 4737 provisions are manda-
tory. 
Counsel Appointment Standards 
Our committee made the judgment that the initial judg-
ment about appropriate standards for the appointment of 
counsel should be made within the individual States, where 
officials are familiar with local needs, conditions, and 
resources. H.R. 4737 and S. 1757 both impose uniform manda-
tory standards for appointment and competence. I applaud 
the purpose of these provisions, which is to assure high 
quality counsel. My concern is that the provisions in S. 
1757 may be so burdensome and expensive that States would 
elect not to comply with them. 
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H.R. 4737 provides even more complex and burdensome 
requirements. But this proposal would not be optional with 
the States. Ra the r, States a re simply commanded to leg is-
late elaborate schemes for provision of counsel through the 
entire course of every capital case. If the State fails to 
do this, neither state procedural rules nor state court 
findings of fact would be honored by the federal habeas 
court as required by current law. I doubt that Congress 
knowingly would approve a statute that simply commands 
States to legislate a program and then spend state funds in 
support of it. This is not the way federal legislation usu-
ally works in our constitutional system. The counsel stand-
ards of H.R. 4737 are so burdensome that I doubt any state 
legislature would enact them. The effect of H.R. 4737 would 
then be to eliminate by statute respect for state procedural 
rules, and to provide by statute that state court findings 
of fact should be ignored. This result suggests a disturb-
ing lack of respect for state courts and judges. 
I agree with those who say that the fairness of capital 
litigation would be enhanced by the provision of better 
counsel at the early stages of capital litigation, especial-
ly at trial. This is just one aspect of the general need in 
the United States for quality legal assistance for those who 
are unable to afford it. In an era of budget deficits and 
scarce resources, however, it is not realistic to assume 
that Congress may simply decree that States shall provide 
counsel and state funding under rigid mandatory require-
ments. Our Committee tried to assess the situation realis-
tically, and to give the States an incentive to provide 
counsel in one area where it is not required at all -- at 
the state postconviction stage. I continue to believe our 
approach is a constructive one. 
Repetitive Habeas Corpus Petitions 
Both of the bills I am addressing would severely weaken 
the part of the habeas statute aimed at limiting multiple, 
repetitive habeas petitions. Instead of placing limits on 
multiple filings after the first full course of litigation, 
H.R. 4737 and S. 1757 would make multiple reviews more 
readily available. As I have said before, after the full 
course of review under our Committee's proposal, a prisoner 
would have had review by a jury and at least 21 judges. We 
therefore believe it would be fair and in the interest of 
justice to bar further review unless there is an unresolved 
question of factual innocence of the crime. Under both H.R. 
4737 and S. 1757, there could be limitless new challen9es to 
the "appropriateness" of the capital sentence. The problem 
with this vaguely worded provision is that every new claim 
presented in a capital cases is a claim that the sentence is 
"inappropriate." The effect of this provision would be to 
allow limitless appeals, a system less rational than the 
present one, under which single capital case prisoners often 
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come before the Supreme Court of the United States oncer-
tiorari five or more times. 
Time Limits and Automatic Stay 
H.R. 4737 does provide, at least in theory, for a limi-
tations period to move cases through the system. But in-
stead of the six month provision recommended by our Commit-
tee, the period is extended in H.R. 4737 to one year. More 
important, the limitations period does not apply at all 
where a prisoner presents a "colorable claim of ... ineligi-
bi 1 i ty for a capital sentence" not previously presented. 
But as I have stated above, almost any claim in a capital 
case could fit this description. The result is that H.R. 
4737 appears to provide a needed limitations period, but 
provides no real time limit, and no incentive to a prisoner 
to bring his claims promptly. I note also that H.R. 4737 
provides for an automatic stay of execution while a prison-
er's claims are pending. Our Committee believes that such 
an automatic stay is desirable, provided other limits on 
repetition and delay are in place. H.R. 4737 provides the 
automatic stay, but no limits on delay and repetition. The 
prospect under H.R. 4737 is that prisoners can continue to 
delay and file repeat petitions, yet gain the protection of 
an automatic stay of execution without even making a showing 
that their claims have merit. 
Procedural Default 
Both of the alternative bills also would change the law 
of procedural default. The law of procedural default re-
qui res that a defendant must raise claims of error at trial, 
when corrections may be made, not years later when the only 
course would be a new trial or sentencing. Some have argued 
that rules of procedural default unfairly allow prisoners to 
forfeit meritorious claims due to the mistakes of their law-
yers. But under current law, procedural default will not 
apply where a lawyer is shown to be incompetent. And with-
out procedural default rules, a capital prisoner has a 
strong incentive to withhold claims for later litigation in 
an effort to produce delay. The language of H.R. 4737 is 
somewhat ambiguous, and differs from that of s. 1757. But 
S. 1757 in clear terms, and apparently H.R. 4737 as well, 
would overrule a series of Supreme Court cases on the law of 
procedural default. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 
478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). This would make it more dif-
ficult for States to defend convictions and sentences from 
attack in a federal habeas court. 
Exhaustion of State Remedies 
Federal law now requires that before claims may be as-
serted in a federal habeas corpus petition, they must first 
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be presented to state courts. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 
509 ( 1982). This represents appropriate respect for feder-
alism -- a state court system should have an opportunity to 
address any errors on its own before intrusion by the feder-
al system. H.R. 4737 appears to alter current law and to 
weaken the exhaustion requirement. Where a prisoner has 
exhausted only some of his claims, he would be allowed to 
present these claims to federal court in a first federal 
petition. If he had other unexhausted claims, H.R. 4737 
would give the prisoner a right to litigate those in state 
court, and then return to federal court for a second federal 
petition as a matter of right. This approach would promote 
piecemeal litigation. 
Retroactivity 
I mention one final area of great importance, that of 
retroactivity. The Supreme Court's cases hold that the le-
gality of a prisoner's conviction and sentence should be 
judged on the basis of the law as it existed at the time of 
his original trial and appeal. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 s. 
Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 
109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). This view, first taken by the late 
Justice Harlan, represents the common sense idea that a 
prisoner should not be able, years after the fact, to chal-
lenge his sentence on the basis of law that was not on the 
books at the time of his crime, trial or appeal. H.R. 4737 
and S. 175 7 would reverse these Supreme Court cases, and 
make it far easier for prisoners to upset their convictions 
in this way. I note that the Judicial Conference voted to 
reject a proposed amendment to our Report that would have 
had the same effect. It would be unfortunate for the recent 
interest in habeas reform to be the occasion for further 
years of delay in capital and other cases by prisoners using 
habeas corpus for continuing challenges to their conviction 
and sentence on the basis of changes in the law. 
Conclusion 
I do not exaggerate when I say that a vote for H. R. 
4737 would in practical effect be a vote to eliminate capi-
tal punishment in the United States. s. 1757 as well would 
leave the situation at least as bad as it is now. I respect 
those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty. If 
I were a legislator I would vote against capital punishment. 
But I see little sense in keeping the penalty, but adopting 
measures that would exacerbate the already chaotic situation 
that frustrates enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
May 24, 1990. 
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Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
May 24, 1990, 9:30 a.m. 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, thank you for allowing me to appear here today to 
testify on the important subject of habeas corpus in capital 
cases. As you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Judicial Conference that was formed to study this topic. 
With me this morning are Professor Al Pearson, who 
served as Reporter for our Committee, and Hewitt Pate, who 
was my Law Clerk during the Committee's work. 
fl The Chief Justice has transmitted) the full Report of our 
Committee and our statutory It is 
now embodied in a bill introduced by Senator Thurmond, s. 
1760. If you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, I request 
that both our Committee Report, and the written version of 
<tl 
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my testimony today, be made part of the formal record of 
this hearing. 
The present dual system of collateral review is in 
complete disarray. It is unique in the world. 
There are no ~ time limits on habeas corpus 
a prisoner may challenge a conviction long after it has 
~ 
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become final, and after witnesses and records a , e Jon g ~ - · 
II 
~ ~. 
Nor is there ~ res judicata. Habeas petitions may be 
\ -1 
brought again and again. Neither the Constitution nor 
common sense supports this. 
The problems presented by unlimited habeas corpus 
litigation are most acute in capital cases. Separate 
procedures are appropriate for capital cases because the 
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s en ten c e is death. J:ld:-8-0' the incentives in these cases are 
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exactly the opposite of those involving imprisonment. The 
prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have his case 
reviewed speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the 
3. 
condemned inmate, whose innocence is rarely in question, 
delay is the overriding objective. 
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The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. While there are approximately 
20,000 murders in this country each year, only a fraction of 
the worst convicted murderers are sentenced to death. 
There are now approximately 2,300 of these 
prisoners awaiting execution. Since the Supreme Court's 
~ 1~'12...) 
1972 Furman decision{ only 128 executions have taken place. 
f\ 
The average length of time between conviction and 
execution has been approximately eight years. Delay of this 
magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough 
review. 
The objective of the proposal of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus that I chaired is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete 
course of collateral review through the state and federal 
4. 
systems. This review should be free from the time pressure 
of an impending execution, and with the assistance of 
competent counsel for the prisoner. 
When this review has concluded, litigation should 
end, absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question 
of factual innocence. Our proposal would not be mandatory. 
It would allow a State to elect to bring collateral 
litigation involving its capital prisoners within the scope 
of a new federal statute. A State could do this by 
providing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
~--
to advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system . 
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~ - Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. 
Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
5. 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
It is important to emphasize the extensive 
procedures that would remain in place under our proposal. 
Assuming a seven-judge state supreme court, the prisoner 
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the end of the process~ have had~ ~e oi e" by at least 
21 judges. 
In light of this fact, comments to the effect 
that our proposal represents a "rush to judgment" are 
irresponsible. 
* * * 
A number of proposals for changes in current habeas 
corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed 
its report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five 
proposed amendments to our Committee's proposal. 
Senator Biden's S. 1757 and Chai r man i..-/ 
Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" of 
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habeas corpus. In my view, both of these bills would leave 
the capital habeas corpus system in greater disarray than 
under present law. 
Support for these proposals would mean support for 
increased delay, piecemeal litigation, and more last minute 
appeals. Whiles. 1757 in present form would be optional 
with the States, H.R. 4737 and mandatory 
~ 
changes in the federal habeas convicted 
criminals both in capital and noncapital cases. ~~---
In brief summary ~ ~ i ~ """"~ P-t ~ 
)/\ ~ 
s ~a-:L--r:.e--a.scDL1.-&-~ d-£'--c"o-F1i-e-E!"l! n. They impose requirements for 
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the appointment of counsel that appear to be too complex and 
expensive for them to have a realistic chance for state 
support. 
I agree with the general aim of these provisions, 
which is to assure the provision of high quality counsel. 
7. 
But we must recognize the reality of financial and other 
7-t~ions 
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The two bills would eliminate the protections our 
A 
proposal sought to provide against repetitive habeas corpus 
petitions. Prisoners now often file thre1 f · ,. or more 
~ 
petitions to delay their executions. But both S. 1757 and 
H.R. 4737 would increase the availability of repetitive 
petitions. 
Both bills would overrule Supreme Court cases on 
the law of procedural default, e.g. Wainwright v. Sykes. 
The law now requires prisoners generally to present claims 
of error at trial, where corrective measures may be taken. 
Under the pending bills, claims could be brought many years 
-ltlt}- ~ 
later, without regard to whether they related to) %fi.t cne ing. · 
The bills also would overrule Supreme Court cases on 
retroactivity. The bills would change the law to allow 
prisoners to attack the legality of their sentences not only 
8 • 
on the basis of the law at the time of their trial and 
appeal, but also to allow further challenges based on new 
law not on the books at the time the conviction became 
final. 
In short, a vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical 
effect be a vote to eliminate capital punishment in the 
United States. S. 1757 as c e H. would leave the situation at 
least as~ as it is now. 
I respect those who argue for the abolition of the 
death penalty. If I were a legislator I would vote against 
capital punishment. But it is neither rational or in the 
public interest to keep the penalty, but adopt measures that 
~~ 
would exacerbate the already chaotic situation and 
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enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
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Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
May 24, 1990, 9:30 a.m. 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, thank you for allowing me to appear here today to 
testify on the important subject of habeas corpus in capital 
cases. As you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Judicial Conference that was formed to study this topic. 
With me this morning are Professor Al Pearson, who 
served as Reporter for our Committee, and Hewitt Pate, who 
was my Law Clerk during the Committee's work. 
The Chief Justice has transmitted to the Congress 
the full Report of our Committee and our statutory proposal. 
It is now embodied in a bill introduced by Senator Thurmond, 
s. 1760. If you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, I 
request that both our Committee Report, and the written 
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version of my testimony today, be made part of the formal 
record of this hearing. 
The present dual system of collateral review is in 
complete disarray. It is unique in the world. 
There are no time limits on habeas corpus -- a 
prisoner may challenge a conviction long after it has become 
final, and after witnesses and records no longer are 
available. Nor does res judicata apply. Habeas petitions 
may be brought again and again. Neither the Constitution 
nor common sense supports this. 
The problems presented by unlimited habeas corpus 
", \J , litigation are most acute in capital cases .• Separate 
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~- in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those involving imprisonment. The prisoner 
serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
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3. 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate, whose innocence is rarely in question, delay is the 
overriding objective. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. While there are approximately 
20,000 murders in this country each year, only a fraction of 
the worst convicted murderers are sentenced to death. 
There are now approximately 2,300 of these 
prisoners awaiting execution. Since the Supreme Court's 
1972 Furman decision in 1972, only 128 executions have taken 
place. 
'LI The ave r age length of time between conv t ction an9 • 
C•CJlrJL\ ~ is,~ t:.~, -a ~ ~pd'1~1b', 11+-t,, ~ u-v-'§-QA 
r~\/c~ eet~ ('11~ ""~ f-lJfc,J. c.,i.'te. ____..,Jvr 
execution has been approx~inately _eig-ht years. ~ 1 elay of this 
magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough 
review. 
The objective of the proposal of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus that I chaired is this: 
4. 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete 
course of collateral review through the state and federal 
systems. This review should be free from the time pressure 
of an impending execution, and with the assistance of 
competent counsel for the prisoner. 
When this review has concluded, litigation should 
end, absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question 
of factual innocence. Our proposal would not be mandatory. 
It would allow a State to elect to bring collateral 
litigation involving its capital prisoners within the scope 
of a new federal statute. A State could do this by 
providing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
to advance fairness - the fundamental requirement of a 
justice system. Where the death penalty is involved, 
fairness means a searching and impartial review of the 
propriety of the sentence. 
5. 
Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
It is important to emphasize the extensive 
procedures that would remain in place under our proposal. 
Assuming a seven-judge state supreme court, the prisoner at 
the end of the process would have had his case reviewed by 
at least 21 judges. 
In light of this fact, comments to the effect 
that our proposal represents a "rush to judgment" are 
irresponsible. 
* * * 
A number of proposals for changes in current habeas 
corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed 
its report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five 
proposed amendments to our Committee's proposal. 
6. 
Senator Biden's S. 1757 and Chairman Kastenmeier's 
H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" of habeas corpus. In 
my view, both of these bills would leave the capital habeas 
corpus system in greater disarray than under present law. 
Support for these proposals would mean support for 
increased delay, piecemeal litigation, and more last minute 
appeals. While S. 1757 in present form would be optional 
with the States, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and mandatory 
changes in the federal habeas statutes. These changes would 
favor convicted criminals both in capital and noncapital 
cases. 
In brief summary, there are reasons to be concerned 
about the two pending bills. They would impose requirements 
for the appointment of counsel that appear to be too complex 
and expensive for them to have a realistic chance for state 
support. 
7 . 
I agree with the general aim of these provisions, 
which is to assure the provision of high quality counsel. 
But we must recognize the reality of financial and other 
state limitations. 
The two bills would eliminate the protections our 
Committee's proposal sought to provide against repetitive 
habeas corpus petitions. Prisoners now often file three or 
more petitions to delay their executions. But both S. 1757 
and H.R. 4737 would increase the availability of repetitive 
petitions. 
Both bills would overrule Supreme Court cases on 
the law of procedural default, e.g. Wainwright v. Sykes. 
The law now requires prisoners generally to present claims 
of error at trial, where corrective measures may be taken. 
Under the pending bills, claims could be brought many years 
later, without regard to whether they related to innocence. 
• 
8 • 
The bills also would overrule Supreme Court cases on 
retroactivity. The bills would change the law to allow 
prisoners to attack the legality of their sentences not only 
on the basis of the law at the time of their trial and 
appeal, but also to allow further challenges based on new 
law not on the books at the time the conviction became 
final. 
In short, a vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical 
effect be a vote to eliminate capital punishment in the 
United States. S. 1757 would leave the situation at least 
as unsatisfactory as it is now. 
I respect those who argue for the abolition of the 
death penalty. If I were a legislator I would vote against 
capital punishment. But it is neither rational or in the 
public interest to keep the penalty, but adopt measures that 
would exacerbate the already chaotic situation, and that 











Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
May 24, 1990, 9:30 a.m. 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House 
Subcommittee on Courts, thank you for allowing me 
appear here today/ to testify on the im;>ortant 
.J ~ ~ ~ • 
of habeas corpus in capi tal~ ses .A As you 
chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Conferencf that was formed to study this 
With me this morning are Professor Al 
P~ n, / who served as Reporter for our Committee,/ 
and Hewit ate,/ who was my Law Clerk during the 
Committee's 
X )C. >t 
The Chief Justice has transmitted to the 
Congress the full Report of our Committee and our 
statutory proposal. It is now embodied in a bill 
introduced by Senator Thurmond, S. 1760.'{/ If you 
think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, / I~ eq}!est that 
~ hour Committee Report, / and the ~ en version 
of my testimony today, / be made part of the formal 
record of this hearing. 
1J ~ ~f~a.2-. 




The present dual system 
reviewf s in ~ te disar! ay. 
of collateral 
~ 





There are !!_O 1:_ime l ~ its o,f!;~pus/ 
-- ,Al prisoner may challenge a conviction/ 1~ 
a~ r it has become final,/and after witnesses and 
records no longer are available. Nor does res 
judicata apply. 
again and again. 
~
Habeas petitions may be brought 
Neither the Constitution/ nor 
common sense supports this. 
The problems presented by unlimited habeas 
corpus litigation/are most acute in 





cases/ because the ~ es in these cases are 
exactly the opposite of those involving 
imprisonme~ The prisoner serving a term of 
years/ seeks to have his case reviewed speedily/ in 
the hope of gaining release.1/ For the condemned 
inmate, /whose innocence is r~ stion/ 
delay is the overriding objective . 
.,....._... 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 
S~ s/a re ~ t being enfor~ by th~ . 




~✓/ ~ 3. 
(  this country each year , ~ ly a fraction of the 
I \Jv-'1;'"v~ ~ _w~~ nvicted murderer:/are sentenced to death. 
/V ; ~ qr There are now approximately 2,300 of 
~ i_JJ,D ;° 
bD 
✓ I 
these prisoners awaiting execution. Since the 
Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision,/ only 1~8 
executions have taken place. ____, 
The average length of time between 
conviction and execution has been approximately 
I Z f' 
~()_ 
e !_9h !_ y~ rs. Capital sentencing >~ of course ,I\ a. 
grave responsibility,/ and judges review each case 
with special care. ,tffe1a f ::l"'this magnitude/ is 
hardly necessary for fairness / or for thorough 
review. 
. ~ 
The objective of the proposal of ~ :a(ld 
'-1';,zt!!I- ..,, "" ""' 
lliillic~ Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus/ that I 
chaired/ is this: 11capital cases should be subject 
to one fair and complete course of collateral -
review /through the state and federal systems. 
This review should be free from the time pressure/ 
of an impending execution,(and with the assistance 
of competent counsel for the prisoner. 
~
When this review has concluded, 












circumstances r--a..:L.s-i-ag a question of factual 
innocence. / our proposal would ~;!: m~ ~ ry~ 
It would allow a State/ to elect to bring 
collateral litigatio~ volving its capital 
prisonersf ithin the scope of a new federal 
statute. A State could do this by providing 
competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
a;.~ 
In sum, 1\-Mfe puf pose of the Committee's 
proposal is to advance fairness - the fundamental 
requirement of a justice system. Where the death 
penalty is involved,jt-airness means a searching 
and impartial review of the propriety of the 
sentence. 
Fairn~ _s als __ o requires/ that if a 
prisoner's claims are found to be without merit/ 
~ ciet! is entitled/ to have a lawful penalty 
~ d out/ without unreasonable delay. 
It is important to emphasize the --
extensive procedures/ that would remain in place ----------
under our proposal. Assuming a seven-judge state 
supreme court, / the 
process would have 
) 
least ~ j u2S_es. 
prisone ~ at the end of the 
had his case reviewed/ by at 
• effect 
judgi 
* * * 
5 . 
7f I mention briefly/ proposals for changes 
in current habeas corpus law that have been 
since~ r Committee filed its report ~ 
ed__amendmen..t osa ..,. . 
. S..u,.-.k~~ Jl Senator Biden's S. 1757 t and Chairman 
~ f3U< -
Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737},ould make major changes 
in federal habeas corpus. In my view, these bills 
would - if adopted - leave the capital habeas 
corpus system in greater disarray than under ---~- ---
present law. 
77 These proposals x ould result in increased 
delay, ji>iecemeal litigation, find in more last 
minute appeals. S. 1757 in present form, would be 
--o~ l with the States, H.R. 4737 would make 
sweeping and mandatory changes in the federal - - --
habeas statutes. These changes would favor 












In brief summary,/ there are reasons to be 
concerned about the two pending bills. They would 
impose requirements for the appointment of counsei/ ____ --, 
---·~ 
that appear to be too~~ ve/ for 
them to have a realistic chance for state support. 
4~~-!-, 
I agree with the general aim of the~e ~- _L 
A fr:,.j;k ~ ~ 
provisions, which is to assure~ tse ~vi s i en of 
hi~ qua l.U¥- QeU1u,e7. But we must recognize the "'22 bl -. cc. zs, r-4 f 
reality of financial land other state limitations. 
---- .,Ir [ ' ~
The two bills~ would eliminate the 
protections our Committee's proposal ·sought to 
repetitive habeas corpus .. 
isoners now often file ~ ree or more 
petitions to delaN heir exe,3utions,./4 .im.. .., ~
1757 and H.R. 4737 wo~ increase the availability 
of repetitive petitions. 
~ 17 Both bills ~would 
~-.t,,y.~Ut-
1\ - -
overrule Supreme Court 
cases on the law of procedural default, e.g. 
Wainwright v. Sykes. The law now requires 
prisoners generally to present claims of error at 
trial, /where corrective measures may be taken. 
Under the pending bills,j claims could be brought 
U.c.:f 








many years later, without regard to whether they 
related to innocence. 
The bills also would overrule Supreme 
~
Court cases on retroactivity. T-lt.@ b i l l s would 
~ I\, 
7 • 
change the law/to allow prisoners to attack the 
legality of their sentences/ not only on the basis 
of the law at the time of their trial and appeay,' 
but also to allow further challenges based on new 
1~ /not on the books at the time the conviction 
became final. J.. 
C2A..-J ~ <..:1, 
IA sho ~ ~ vote for H~ 7 would i ~ 
pra~ ct/ be a vote .... 'to elimin~ l 
punishment in the United States jls. 1757 would 
~ ·--~ 
leave the si tuation~ .Si I,.. as unsatisfactory as 
it is now. 
X :X y 
I respect those who argue for the 
abolition of the death penalty. If I were a 
legislator/ I would vote against capital 
punishment. But it is neither rationa / W in the 
l ft 
public interest/ to keep the penalty, / but adopt 
measures that would exacerbate the already chaotic 
situation,/and tha~ trate enforcement of 
the laws of 37 States. 
J 







Judicial Conference Amendment to my 
Committee's Proposal 
In September the Judicial Conference 
considered the proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee, 
and approved all of them except for two amendments 
as follows: 
1. The Conference endorsed more detailed ._________, 
standards for the appointment of counsel in 
~
capital cases, based on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988. v-t>-/-t I ti- -1-t, 1 L 
2. The Conference endorsedAa~ amen~ment 
similar, to the provision in the Biden Bill and 
Kastenmeier•s Bill, that would weaken the .., 
Committee's proposed limit on repetitive J~ 
petitions. 
Summary: Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
L~· . ... . - ·;.,.: 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not bei ng 
enforced by the courts. While there are approximately 20, 0(:)(:) 
murders in this country each year, only a fraction of the worst 
convicted murderers a re sentenced to death. The re a re now ap-
pr oximately 2,300 of these prisoners awaiting execution, yet 
since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furma n decision only 128 execu-
tions have taken place. The a ver ag e l en gth of time between con-
viction and execution has bee n approx imately eight years . Oe l ay 
of this magnitude is hardly necessa r y for fairness or for thor-
ough review. 
The objective of the proposal of the Ad Hoe Cemmi t tee of 
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases that I chaired is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete cQu rse 
of collateral review through the state and federal systems. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending e~e ~ 
cution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for the 
p risoner. When this review has concluded, litigation should eAd, 
absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question of fa c tual 
innocence. Our proposal would allow a State to eleet to bring 
collateral litigation involving its capita l prisoners within the 
scope of a new federal statute. A State could do this by provid-
ing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. In sum, 
t he purpose of the Committee's proposal is to advance the funda-
mental requirement of a justice system -- fairness. Where the 
death penalty is involved, fairness means a searching and impar-
t ial review of the propriety of the sentence. Fairness also re ~ 
quires that if a prisoner's claims are found to be without merit, 
society is entitled to have a lawful penalty carried out without 
unreasonable delay. 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current habe -
as corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed its 
report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five proposecl 
amendments to our Committee's proposal. Senator Biden's s. 1757 
and Chairman Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" 
of habeas corpus. I regret that I must say both of these bills 
would leave the capital habeas corpus system in greater disarray 
than under present law. In short, support for these proposals 
would mean support for increased delay, piecemeal litigation, and 
more last minute appeals. While S. 1757 would in present form be 
optional with the States, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and man-
datory changes in the federal habeas statutes that favor convict-
ed criminals both in capital and noncapital cases. 
A vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be a vote to 
eliminate capital punishment in the United States. s. 1757 as 
well would leave the situation at least as bad as it is now. I 
respect those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty. 
If I were a legislator I would vote against capital punishment. 
But I see little sense in keeping the penalty, but adopting meas-
u res that would exacerbate the already chaotic situation that 
frustrates enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
Summary: Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not being 
enforced by the courts. While there are approximately 20,000 
murders in this country each year, only a fraction of the worst 
convicted mu rde re rs a re sentenced to death. The re a re now ap-
proximately 2,300 of these prisoners awaiting execution, yet 
since the Supreme Court's 1972 Fu rman decision only 128 execu-
tions have taken place. The average length of time between con-
viction and execution has been approximately eight years. Delay 
of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or for thor-
ough review. 
The objective of the proposal of the Ad Hoe Cemmi t tee ef 
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital eases that I chaired is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete course 
of collateral review through the state and federal systems. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending e~e-
cution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for the 
prisoner. When this review has concluded, litigation should end, 
absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question of factual 
innocence. Our proposal would allow a State to elect to bring 
collateral litigation involving its capital prisoners within the 
scope of a new federal statute. A State could do this by provid-
ing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. In sum, 
the purpose of the Committee's proposal is to advance the funda-
mental requirement of a justice system -- fairness. Where the 
death penalty is involved, fairness means a searching and impar-
tial review of the propriety of the sentence. Fairness also re~ 
quires that if a prisoner's claims are found to be without merit, 
society is entitled to have a lawful penalty carried out without 
unreasonable delay. 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current mabe-
as corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed its 
report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five proposed 
amendments to our Committee's proposal. Senator 8iden's s. 1757 
and Chairman Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" 
of habeas corpus. I regret that I must say both of these bills 
would leave the capital habeas corpus system in greater disarray 
than under present law. In short, support for these proposals 
would mean support for increased delay, piecemeal litigation, and 
more last minute appeals. While S. 1757 would in present form be 
optional with the States, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and man-
datory changes in the federal habeas statutes that favor convict-
ed criminals both in capital and noncapital cases. 
A vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be a vote to 
eliminate capital punishment in the United States. S. 1757 as 
well would leave the situation at least as bad as it is now. I 
respect those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty. 
If I were a legislator I would vote against capital punishment. 
But I see little sense in keeping the penalty, but adopting meas-
ures that would exacerbate the already chaotic situation tl:lat 
frustrates enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
Summary: Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not being 
enforced by the courts. While there are approximately 20, 00(:) 
murders in this country each year, only a fraction of the worst 
convicted murderers are sentenced to death. There are now ap-
proximately 2,300 of these prisoners awaiting execution, yet 
since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision only 128 execu-
tions have taken place. The average length of time between con-
viction and execution has been approximately eight years. Oelay 
of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or for thor-
ough review. 
The objective of the proposal of the Ad Hoc Ceromi t tee of 
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases that I chaired is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete course 
of collateral review through the state and federal systems. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending e~e-
cution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for the 
prisoner. When this review has concluded, litigation should end, 
absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question of factual 
innocence. Our proposal would allow a State to elect to bring 
collateral litigation involving its capital prisoners within the 
scope of a new federal statute. A State could do this by provid-
ing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. In sum, 
the purpose of the Committee's proposal is to advance the funda-
mental requirement of a justice system -- fairness. Where the 
death penalty is involved, fairness means a searching and impar-
tial review of the propriety of the sentence. Fairness also re-
quires that if a prisoner's claims are found to be without merit, 
society is entitled to have a lawful penalty carried out without 
unreasonable delay. 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current ~abe-
as corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed its 
report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five proposed 
amendments to our Committee's proposal. Senator Biden's S. 1757 
and Chairman Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" 
of habeas corpus. I regret that I must say both of these bills 
would leave the capital habeas corpus system in greater disarray 
than under present law. In short, support for these proposals 
would mean support for increased delay, piecemeal litigation, and 
more last minute appeals. While S. 1757 would in present form be 
optional with the States, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and m~A-
datory changes in the federal habeas statutes that favor convict-
ed criminals both in capital and noncapital cases. 
A vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be a vote to 
eliminate capital punishment in the United States. S. 1757 as 
well would leave the situation at least as bad as it is now. I 
respect those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty. 
If I were a legislator I would vote against capital punishment. 
But I see little sense in keeping the penalty, but adopting meas-
ures that would exacerbate the already chaotic situation that 
frustrates enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
Summary: Testimony of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
on Reform of Capital Habeas Corpus 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not being 
enforced by the courts. While there are approximately 20,000 
murders in this country each year, only a fraction of the worst 
convicted murderers are sentenced to death. There are now ap-
proximately 2,300 of these prisoners awaiting execution, yet 
since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision only 128 execu-
tions have taken place. The average length of time between con-
viction and execution has been approximately eight years. Oelay 
of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or for thor~ 
ough review. 
The objective ✓ of the proposal of the Ad Hoc Commit tee of 
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases that I chaired is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete course 
of collateral review through the state and federal systems. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending exe~ 
cution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for the 
prisoner. When this review has concluded, litigation should eng, 
absent extraordinary circumstances raising a question of factual 
innocence. Our proposal would allow a State to elect to bring 
collateral litigation involving its capital prisoners within the 
scope of a new federal statute. A State could do this by provid-
ing competent counsel in state post-conviction review. In sum, 
the purpose of the Committee's proposal is to advance the funda-
mental requirement of a justice system -- fairness. Where the 
death penalty is involved, fairness means a searching and impar-
tial review of the propriety of the sentence. Fairness also re-
quires that if a prisoner's claims are found to be without merit, 
society is entitled to have a lawful penalty carried out without 
unreasonable delay. 
A number of competing proposals for changes in current habe-
as corpus law have been introduced since our Committee filed its 
report, and the Judicial Conference approved two of five proposed 
amendments to our Committee's proposal. Senator Biden's S. 1757 
and Chairman Kastenmeier's H.R. 4737 purport to aim for "reform" 
of habeas corpus. I regret that I must say both of these bills 
would leave the capital habeas corpus system in greater disarray 
than uFlder present law. In short, support for these proposals 
would mean support for increased delay, piecemeal litigation, and 
more last minute appeals. Whiles. 1757 would in present form be 
optional with the States, H.R. 4737 would make sweeping and man-
datory changes in the federal habeas statutes that favor convict-
ed criminals both in capital and noncapital cases. 
A vote for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be a vote to 
eliminate capital punishment in the United States. s. 1757 as 
well would leave the situation at least as bad as it is now. I 
respect those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty. 
If I were a legislator I would vote against capital punishment. 
But I see little sense in keeping the penalty, but adopting meas-
ures that would exacerbate the al ready chaotic situation that 
frustrates enforcement of the laws of 37 States. 
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House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice, 









16 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9=30 a.m., in 
171 Room 2 2 2 6, Rayburn House Off ice Building, Hon. Robert W. 
181 Kastenmeier [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 
19 Present: Representatives Kastenmeier, Crockett, Berman, 
201 Sangmeister, Hughes, Moorhead, Coble and Sensenbrenner. 
211 Staff Present: Virginia E. Sloan, Counsel; Joseph V. 
221 Wolfe, Minority Counsel; Charles G. Geyh, Counsel; Stephanie 
231 A. Ward, Clerk; Michael J. Remington, Chief Counsel; and 
241 Elizabeth R. Fine, Counsel. 
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175 Would all three of you come forward as a panel? 
176 
177 STATEMENTS OF THE HOM. LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., ASSOCIATE 
178 JUSTICE, RETIRED, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ACCOMPANIED 
179 BY HEWITT PATE; HOM. PAUL H. ROMEY, JUDGE, U.S. COURT OF 
180 APPEALS FOR THE 11th CIRCUIT, ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA; AND 






STATEMENT OF HOK. LEWIS F. POWELL 
Judge POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We 
1871 appreciate the opportunity to be here. It is quite obvious 
1881 from the fact that you have introduced an important bill and 
1891 that others have studied the problem, it is a basic and 
1901 serious problem in our country at this time. 
1911 It is good to see that you and your committee are taking 
1921 it as seriously as the problem deserves. I want to thank 
1931 you you, all of you, for allowing me to appear here today to 
1941 testify. I will be brief because we have filed a statement, 
1951 a fairly long one and also a summary one. 
196 Mr. KASTEKMEIER. Without objection, sir, your statement 
197 and that of our witnesses will be received for the record 
198 and you may proceed in any manner you wish. 
1991 Judge POWELL. I mentioned that Al Pearson is here. He is 
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2 0 OI on the faculty of the Uni vei:s i ty of Geoi:g ia school of Law, 
2011 and my clei:k, Hewitt Pate is also seated behind me. He has 
202 woi:ked with the committee appointed by Chief Justice 












As you know, of coui:se, the Chief Justice has ti:ansmitted 
to the Congi:ess a full i:epoi:t of oui: committee as well as 
oui: statutoi:y pi:oposal. It is now embodied in the bill 
inti:oduced by Senatoi: Thui:mond at 1760. 
If you think it appi:opi:iate, Mi:. Chaii:man, I would i:equest 
that both oui: committee i:epoi:t and the wi:itten vei:sion of my 
testimony today be made a foi:mal pai:t of the i:eco i: d. 
Mi:. KASTEHMEIER. Without objection, that will be done. 
[ The Committee i:epoi:t follows: ] 
********** COMMITTEE INSERT********* 





Judge POWELL. Thank you, sir. 
I think it has already been noted this morning that the 
dual system of collateral review that we all accept and 
approve of with respect to capital punishment, it is in 
2191 disarray. There are no time limits on Federal habeas corpus 
2201 and we do not suggest any. 
221 But the fact remains that a prisoner may challenge a 
222 conviction long after it has become final and after 
223 witnesses and records are no longer available. 
224 judicata apply. 
Hor does res 
225 habeas petitions may be brought again and again. Heither 
2261 the Constitution nor common sense supports this in every 






litigation are most acute in capital cases. 
Separate proceedings are appropriate for capital cases 
because the incentives in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those who are in prison. The prisoner serving a 
number of years expects his case reviewed speedily to gain 
2331 release. For the condemned inmate whose innocence is rarely 
2341 in question, delay is the overriding objective. 
235 The laws of 37 States that still have capital punishment 
236 are simply not being enforced by the courts. 
2371 There are approximately 20,000 murders in the United 
2381 States each year. I think it is interesting, and I made 
2391 this comparison once before, that during the Vietnam War a 
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During the 2401 total of 68,000 Al1lericans were killed. same 
2411 seven years in the United States, there were about 140,000 
242 murders. 
243 I think it has been suggested that several of the cities 
244 in our country, cities alone in terms of murders committed, 
245 are far ahead, not that anyone would like to be ahead in 
246 this category, but they are far ahead of the entire country 
247 in some of the Western democracies. 
248 As has been mentioned, there are now about 2,300 prisoners 











fraction of that number who have been sentenced to death 
have, in fact, been executed. The average length of 
tirne--and this also has been mentioned--between conviction and 
execution in the country to date has been about between 
eight and nine years. 
Capital sentencing, of course, has a grave responsibility 
and judges review these cases with very special care. But 
delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or 
for thorough review. The objective of the proposal of the 
Committee on Federal habeas corpus that I chaired is this, 
2601 and I quote, capital cases should be the subject of one fair 
261 I and complete course of collateral review through the State 
2621 and Federal systems. 
263 This review should be freedom from the time pressures of 
264 an impending execution and, of course, with the assistance 
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When this review has concluded, litigation should end in 
the absence of circumstances that raise a question of 
factual innocence. Our proposal would not be mandatory. It 
269 would allow a State to elect to bring collateral litigation 
270 involving c a pital prisoners within the scope of a new 
271 Federal statute. 


















State post - conviction revie w. 
A point here which is sometimes overlooked, the lawyer who 
trie d the case may not h a ve been the best lawyer in the 
world. There is good to be said for appointing separate 
counsel for State collateral review so that counsel, if the 
facts properly suggest it, could charge the trial counsel 
with ineffective assistance of counsel . 
That would be a reform that we think would be quite 
important. 
In summary, the major purpose of the committee's proposal 
is to advance fairness, which is the fundamental requirement 
of our justice system, where the death penalty is involved. 
Fairness means an impartial review of the propriety of the 
sentence. It is important, also, we think, to keep in mind 
that fairness requires that if a prisoner's claims are found 
to be without merit, society is entitled to have a lawful 
penalty carried out without unreasonable delay. 
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2901 It is important to emphasize the extensive procedures that 
2911 would remain in place under our proposal. Assuming that the 
2921 State Supreme Court has seven judges, true in my State of 
2931 Virginia, the prisoner at the end of the process, as we 
2941 would contemplate it, would have had the case reviewed by at 
2951 least 21 judges. 
296 I mention only briefly proposals for change to current 
297 habeas corpus law that have been introduced since our 
2981 committee filed its report. Senator Biden, this is Senate 
2991 bill 17 57, and, of course, your distinguished Chairman has 









of these would make major changes in Federal habeas corpus 
as it presently is enforced. 
I am frank to say that these bills do concern me in some 
respects. I won't go into detail, because the papers we 
have filed do so. It seems to me, though, and I hope that I 
am wrong, it seems to me that the proposals could result in 
increased delay and perhaps in piecemeal legislation and 
also in last minute appeals. 
3091 S.R. 1757 in its present form would be optional to the 
310 States. I believe, if I understand it correctly, that your 
311 bill, Mr. Chairman, would make sweeping and mandatory 
3121 changes in the Federal basic statutes, the bill itself, 
3131 would not--it would be optional with the States. 
3141 These changes would favor convicted criminals in a good 










many circumstances in both capital and non-capital cases. 
In brief summary, there are reasons, we think, to require 
a more careful examination or re-examination perhaps of 
these bills. I say that with full appreciation of the fact 
that there is no easy way to deal with this problem and the 
committee I chaired had six separate meetings. 
We had highly competent counsel. We worked very hard 
trying to find some solution that would embody fairness in 
every sense of the word and also improve the current system 
324 in which there is so much delay and repetition. 
325 Of course, I agree strongly with the general aim of the 
3261 proposals, Congressman Kastenmeier, and Senator Biden, but I 
3271 think also when you look to the States for the major 
3281 responsibility in providing counsel, for example, of the 
3291 level of competency that is understandably suggested in some 
330 of these bills, it will be hard to find such counsel and 
331 also some States would have some difficulty in compensating 
332 them to the point where they would be willing to take part. 
333 The bills also, as I read them, could eliminate the 
334 protection our committee proposal sought to provide against 





petitions to delay their exclusion. It is possible that 
both the Senate and House legislation could increase the 
availability of the petitions. 
I would like to say just a word about my experience when I 
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know, because of health reasons a couple of years ago. I 
was a Supreme Court Justice assigned to be the Justice for 
the 11th Circuit, originally for the old 5th, which included 
344 the six southern States. 









the greatest number of capital cases arise from all three of 
those States. 
What would happen typically in a capital case is that the 
prisoners would file three or four petitions for delay. I 
will just cite a couple of examples. 
I have been awakened at two o'clock in the morning when an 
execution was scheduled the following morning and the 
Supreme Court had reviewed it not once, but twice, during 
3541 the day bey repetitive petition. Lawyers will line up, 
3551 different lawyers, to file repetitive petitions under the 
3561 present system. 
357 So that there is no wonder that you have an average of 
358 eight years delay in the carrying out of a sentence of 
3591 death . I mention, also, this--and I am about to conclude--the 
3601 pending bills, both here and in the Senate, as I understand 
361 I it, would overrule several Supreme Court cases. 
3621 Particularly Wainwright against Sikes, which provides what 
3631 happens in the event of procedural default. 
3641 The law now requires prisoners generally to present claims 
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the claims could have been raised if counsel had had the 
incentive to do it. 
Under pending bills, claims could be brought, many without 
r e gard as to whether they are related to innocence and that 
concerns us. The bills also would overrule Supreme Court 
cases on retroactivity. 
They would change the law to allow prisoners to attack the 
legality of their sentences not only on the basis of the law 
at the time of trial and appeal, but also to allow further 
challenges based on new law not on the books at the time the 
conviction became final. 
I think certainly, as I view it, and of course, I could be 
3781 wrong, a vote for H.R. 4737 could have the practical effect, 
3791 Mr. Chairman, to eliminate enforceable capital punishment in 
3801 the United States. We almost have that already. 
381 Senate bill 1757 would leave the situation about as 
382 unsatisfactory as it is now. 
383 Let me just say this in closing. I respect those who 
3841 argue for the abolition of the death penalty. I have said 
3851 this publicly and I repeat it here. If I were a legislator, 
3861 I would vote against capital punishment. I don't think any 
387 of the other western democracies still have it. 
388 But it does seem to me that it is neither rational or in 
389 the public interest to keep the penalty, but adopt measures 
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390 that would exacerbate the already chaotic situation and 
391 continue to frustrate the enforcement of the law of 37 
392 States. 
393 Mr. Chairman, that concludes the brief statement that I 
394 had in mind delivering here this morning, particularly in 
395 view of the fact that we have filed full briefs. 
396 Again, I repeat, that I appreciate the opportunity to be 
397 here. 
398 [The statement of Judge Powell follows:] 
399 
400 ********** INSERT 1-1 ********* 
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6941 means that petitioners must file a habeas, Federal habeas 
6951 petition 60 days after state review and consideration of the 
6961 petition. Also, the bill fixes time limits for Federal 
6971 judges to consider habeas petitions. For example, the 
698 District Court Judge must rule on petition within 110 days 
699 and the U. S. Supreme Court must act on a certain petition 
7001 within 90 days. 
7011 How do you--are those recommendations of your committee, 
702 Justice Powell? 
703 Judge POWELL. They are not included in our 
704 recommendations. I would suggest that Professor Pearson 
705 probably knows a good deal more about this than I do. Would 
7061 you comment on that, Al? 
707 Mr. PEARSON. As I understand the proposal, which I saw 
708 for the first time yesterday and discussed with some of 
709 Thurmond and Senator Graham's people over at the Senate 
710 yesterday, the Thurmond-Specter Bill eliminates state 
711 I habeas, period. You go straight into Federal Court, which 
7121 you might regard as a rather unusual proposal corning from 
7131 Senator Thurmond given his concern about state's rights. 
7141 But nevertheless, that appears to be the import from a 
7151 reading of the bill. That is the stated intent behind it. 
716 We didn't have that in mind, or at least I don't think we 
717 had the elimination of state habeas review in mind, when we 
718 were working on it, but that is my understanding, sir. 
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career in the Senate . The other is an incorporation of the 
Powell Committee bill, and the most recent proposal is a 
Thurmond - Specter Bill which incorporates some of the 
elements of the Powell Committee proposal and then makes 
major changes in the time tables over what we had 
contemplated in our proposal. 
Mr. KASTEMMEIER. Let me ask you this, the Full Judicial 
Conference in assessing the committee report found that the 
quid pro quo approach advocated to providing qualified 
7 541 counsel. They suggest this would lead to a, and I quote 
7551 them, 11 a creation of different and inconsistent standards 
7561 among the states, that is only treating states provided 
7571 certain post-conviction counsel one way as opposed to states 
758 that did not do so. 11 
759 And they explain that it would result in two sets of 
760 procedures in Federal post-conviction cases. How do you 





Judge POWELL. You are asking about the recommendation of 
the Judicial Conference? The changes that it made in our 
recommendation. I think they did propose quite detailed 
standards for the selection of counsel, and I would think 
766 that that would pose a problem for some of the states. It 
767 would vary pretty widely, I think. 
768 It also included some of the provisions that are quite 
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7691 similar to your bill, Mr. Chairman. I have not reviewed 
770 those since the conference acted I think back in September. 
771 But I have the general impression that it would--that a 
7721 majority of the Judicial Conference, the vote was 14-12. It 
773 would weaken the proposed limits that our committee would 
774 put on repetitive petitions. 
7751 I think that is right, Al, is it not? 
776 
777 
l'lr. PEARSON. Yes. 
Mr. KASTEMl'IEIER. Do you find that their criticism of 
7781 having two sets of procedures in post-conviction cases, one 
7791 for petitioners from states that have opted to adopt 
780 standards and another for those states that have not, you 
781 don't accept that criticism? 
782 
783 
Judge POWELL. Would you comment on that, Al? 
l'lr. PEARSON. There would be a two-track system if you 
7841 adhere to the ''opt-in'' approach that we had recommended. 
7851 Our thinking was that there is enough in the bill to be of 
7861 interest to the states that you would have a pretty good 
7871 response in time. I think it would require one or two 
788 states to make an effort at complying with our competency 
789 standards and perhaps then others would follow along. 
7901 Our view is that if you attempted that type of approach 
7911 you might get some commitment from the states once they 
7921 elect to opt in. It would be greater and perhaps more 
7931 satisfactory then if we try to develop a proposal that was 
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just delay in and of itself was important to overcome, was 
the redundancy of petitions and its burdens on the courts, 
was that a primary problem to address in terms of resolving, 
making recommendations? 
In other words, what was it the committee was formed to 
achieve in terms of responding to what problem? 
Judge POWELL. As I recall the Chief Justice's letters, he 
emphasized the problem of repetitive reviews. Of course--
Mr. KASTEMMEIER. Repetitive review? 
Judge POWELL. Yes. I think, if I understand Professor 
Pearson's statement a moment ago, actually repetitive habeas 
corpus rarely results in any change. I think the study you 
had made down there, Al, found that--a base case, that there 
were only six second habeas petitions that resulted in any 
834I change. And so the repetitive positions burden the courts 
835I because they go through--they go up and down the court 
836 structure. 
837 I won't bore you with identifying the number of courts 
8381 that concern this. But I myself, as I mentioned earlier, as 
839 a circuit justice for those states in the Deep South that 
840 had a fairly large number of capital cases, I just can't 
841I recall about any decision we made on the second or third 
842I habeas petition that changed the view we had expressed at an 
843I earlier one. 
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8441 So the repetitive review consumed a substantial amount of 
8451 judicial time without really benefiting more than a very, 
8461 very, very minor group of people, and I think they would 









Mr. KASTEMMEIER. Thank you. 
At this point in time I would like to yield to the 
gentleman from California, Mr. Moorhead. 
Mr. MOORHEAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Justice Powell, how are the members of the ad hoc 
committee on Federal habeas corpus in capital cases 
selected? 
Judge POWELL. The Chief Justice selected the committee. 
856 I think his idea was that the six southern states had more 
857 experience with capital punishment, substantially more than 
8581 any other state. California now has a very substantial 
8591 capital case problem, but in any event, only the six 
8601 southern states, at the time the Chief submitted his 








Mr. MOORHEAD. Under your committee's proposal, the 
defendant after complete round of Federal collateral review 
would be entitled to file successive petitions only if he 
could demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and make a 
colorable showing of facial innocence. In your experience, 
how often are successive habeas corpus issues related to the 
issue of the defendant's innocence? 
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suggest that it is very rare. 
Mr. MOORHEAD. You would think this might cut down 
dramatically the number of petitions filed? 
Judge POWELL. Successive petitions are rarely 
changed--rarely change the results that were reached after 
the initial review that goes first of all up through the 
state system and then through the state collateral system 
and then goes into Federal District Court for habeas corpus 
and then goes up to the Court of Appeals and finally to the 
Supreme Court on certiori. 
So at that point there have been decisions by, I think 
Judge Roney said 27 judges. I think I figured 21, but 
8821 whatever. A very substantial number of judges who 
8831 considered the prisoner's claim that he has been unfairly--
884 Mr. MOORHEAD. How important is it to you that this 
8851 requirement of facial innocence providing the finality to 
886 the context of Federal collateral review. 
887 very important issue to you? 




Judge POWELL. Would you comment on that? 
Judge ROMEY. I am not sure I understood the question. 
Mr. MOORHEAD. Well, this requirement that insofar as 
8911 successive habeas corpus petitions make a colorable showing 
892 of facial innocence in order to be considered, how important 
893 is that requirement to you? 
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Obviously the basic assumption of our whole state and 
Federal system of justice is that we don't want to convict 
an innocent person of any crime, least of all to impose the 
death sentence. Insofar as I know the death sentence has 
not been imposed on an innocent person since I went on the 
Supreme Court. 
Mr. MOORHEAD. You know when we get involved in this issue 
you can't divorce a personal feeling about the death 
penalty, how they view habeas corpus review and other 
factors that are involved. You know we can say we separate 
them, and certainly you have to a great extent. But for the 
a verage person who doesn't believe in the death penalty, 
907 that is difficult. 
908 But for me, I have heard or read too many articles by 
909 prisoners who say this long delay of eight, 10, 12 years is 
9101 about as difficult a thing as anybody could be required to 
9111 go through, and I personally don't feel too good about 
9121 somebody on death row for 12 years, his time coming up at 
9131 this particular time in history, because it is so long ago 
9141 that these things have happened. 
9151 The Chairman and I had a chance to go to Marion 
9161 Penitentiary, and it greatly concerned me that so many 
9171 prisoners had been murdered by their fellow prisoners over a 
9181 long period of time and even guards, because there is no 
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them, and there were prisoners who bragged that they would 
kill as many chances as they had an opportunity to do. They 
felt no moral compunction and there was no penalty for them, 
granting what they were already serving. 
What are you going to do with cases like that if you don't 
see that these cases are carried out? 
Judge POWELL. The present system in the United States has 
9271 a good many faults, and theories of the fairness of the 
9281 system itself, that is with respect to how people, inmates 
9291 are treated. It varies, I am sure, from state to state and 
930 even within a state. 
931 But if I may come back to what I understood was suggested 
9321 in something you said at the outset, the problem we have is 
9331 that the public generally, polls suggest that 70 to 75 








still provide for it. And yet under our dual system of 
review, we said that we wouldn't want to change, and in view 
of the entire concern we have where anybody is being tried 
and in a case where the death penalty may be imposed, I 
think the fairness of the system should insure the public 
that we--I myself would abolish capital punishment. 
Mr. MOORHEAD. But there is none in the Federal system 
9421 except now that we have provided for people who are involved 
9431 in tremendous drug operations. If they kill somebody in 
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9441 that operations. The Federal system has very, very, very 
9451 little capital punishment in the system. I don't know of 










I have one more question that I wanted to ask. If 
enacted, the provisions of the Powell Committee proposal 
would be optional to the states, while the Chairman's rule 
would mandate that the states make certain changes in their 
procedures. What was the rationale of the Powell Committee 
in deciding on an optional approach for the states? 
In your opinion, are there any advantages to a mandatory 
versus an optional approach? 
Judge POWELL. I think we had a feeling that the Federal 
9561 system ought not to mandate what states should do so long as 
9571 it was within the Constitution. Therefore, the proposal 
958 that we recommended to the Judicial Conference would permit 
959 a state as we, the word we used was to ''opt into'' the 
960 system by appointing competent counsel at the state 
9611 collateral stage when that counsel would have the 
9621 opportunity to charge the trial counsel with effective 






Mr. MOORHEAD. Thank you very much. I very much 
appreciate your testimony. 
Judge POWELL. Thank you, sir. 
Mr. KASTEMMEIER. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan, 
Judge Crockett. 
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Judge RONEY. It should be clear that the six months was 
approved by the Judicial Conference, I think. They didn't 
change that. It was a recommendation that it be for a year, 
but I think by a majority vote they approved it for six 
months. 
This time doesn't run until after the trial, the direct 
appeal and all the way to the Supreme Court of the United 
11351 States with no relief to the defendant. And then collateral 
11361 proceedings are then appropriate. And then the time runs 
11371 upon appointment of counsel after that. 
1138 
1139 
Mr. SANGMEISTER. That clarifies that question. 
under - -your recommendation is that there be one in the 
What 
1140 Federal courts? As I understood Justice Powell correctly, 
1141 he was talking about the fact that when it went through the 
11421 court and the Appeals Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, 
11431 there are 20-some judges reviewing it, and the position of 
1144 the commission is that it should be one petition and that is 
1145 it, is that correct? 
1146 Judge POWELL. Provided there was competent counsel all 
11471 the way through, which was fundamental. 
1148 Judge RONEY. Unless the second petition makes allegations 
1149 of the commission of the crime itself, there can be a second 
1150 petition. 
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1'1r. SAMGl'1EISTER. And what about retroactivity? What was 
the position of the commission? 
Judge ROMEY. We didn't deal with that at all. 
1'1r. SAHGl'1EISTER. Okay. That is all I have. 
1156 1'1r. KASTEHl'1EIER. The gentleman from California, 1'1r. 
1157 Berman? 
1158 Mr. BER1'1AH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11591 I appreciate all of you being here on an important issue. 
11601 I would like to come back to a point that the Chairman 
1161 
1162 
raised, Justice Powell. Your testimony, and you repeated it 
orally, states, ''I do not exaggerate when I say that a vote 
1163 for H.R. 4737 would in practical effect be a vote to 
1164 eliminate capital punishment in the United States.'' 
11651 That is a strong statement. Can you elaborate on why you 
11661 say that? 
11671 Judge POWELL. Why I would vote to abolish capital 
11681 punishment? 
1169 1'1r. BERl'1AH. Ho, I would be interested in that later. But 
11701 right now, perhaps in response to Representative Moorhead's 
11711 point that people aren't able to divorce their feelings on 
11721 habeas corpus from their positions on the death penalty, you 
11731 apparently are able to, and, but I am wondering why you 
11741 think that H.R. 4737 is in practical effect a vote to 
11751 eliminate the death penalty? 
MAME: HJU144030 PAGE 51 
1176 Judge POWELL. It seemed tone that it had a number of 
11771 provisions that would make it far nore difficult to impose a 




Mr. BER?1AM. Well, we have a chart that has been prepared. 
Is it the successive petition issue? I mean, H.R. 4737 
provides a statute of limitations. I take it under existing 
11821 law there is no statute of limitations? 
1183 
1184 
?1r. PEARSON. Mone. 
Mr. BER?1AM. So H.R. 4737 imposes a statute of 
11851 limitations. It has provisio n s with respect to exhaustion. 













chart that compares your committee's report with the 
legislation on the issue of successive petitions, the 
Kastenmeier bill would only allow a successive--first of all, 
you would allow successive petitions where a claim was not 
previously litigated and not previously raised because of 
state action, new law or new facts. And the facts 
underlying the claim if proven would undermine a court's 
confidence in the jury's determination of guilt in the 
underlying offense. 
Does that chart accurately reflect the reports? 
Judge POWELL. 
?1r. BER?1AM. 
I think so. 
H.R. 4737 would allow a successive petition 
11991 where the claim was not previously raised due to state 
12001 interference, new law or new facts or the facts, as 
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12011 opposed--it is an ''or'' here--it would undermine the court's 
12021 confidence in a jury's determination of guilt or underlying 
1203 offense or the sentence of death. 
1204 Do we really not want to allow a successive habeas corpus, 
12051 a successive petition where the assertion is that, and if 
1206 there is no evidence for it presumably that petition can be 
1207 dismissed, but the facts underlying the claim if proven 
1208 would undermine the court's confidence in the jury's 
1209 determination of guilt in the underlying offense or the 
12101 sentence of death? 
1211 Judge POWELL. I th i nk we said before you came in that 
1212 there would be a second petition where the colorable claim 
1213 of innocence was raised that couldn't have been raised 
1214 earlier. 
1215 Mr. BERMAN. Isn't that what this is, isn't that what H.R . 
1216 4737 is in effect? A colorable claim of innocence? 
1217 Judge ROMEY. It says in addition or the appropriateness 
12181 of that question or the consideration that the application 
12191 is necessary in the case of miscarriage of justice. As I 
12201 understand that, courts don't review for the appropriateness 
12211 of the sentence. I don't know exactly what that means. 
12221 There are a lot of people that don't think the death 
12231 sentence is ever appropriate . That asserts a brand new 
1224 standard of review for Federal courts that is not now 
1225 present. 
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994 that the Federal Government should pay. The states pay for 
995 all of the criminal proceedings in state courts. The 
996 Federal Government should be required to pay for any 
997 extension of even state court-originating proceedings in the 
998 Federal judiciary. 
999 I think that is a ruling that any Federal judge could very 
1000 easily make consistent with the constitutional guarantee of 
10011 the right to counsel. So why has this committee and the 
10021 Congress to be concerned with that issue when the judiciary 
10031 is competent to take care of it for themselves? 
1004 Mr. PEARSON. Congressman, when a case gets to Federal 
1005 court, under the 1988 Drug Bill, there is a provision for 
1006 compensation of counsel and in capital cases at this point 
10071 in time. 
1008 Mr. CROCKETT. Put that in the drug bill. But isn't it 
10091 mandated by the Constitution? Why do we need a statute? 
1010 
101 1 
Mr. PEARS OM. Mot in post-conviction review, sir, at this 
point in time. There is no right to counsel in any post-
1012 conviction review, either state or Federal. 
1013 question of compensation has been--
And so the 
1014 Mr. CROCKETT. But you have decided that by judicial 
10151 decision, is that right? By current interpretation of the 






The Supreme Court hasn't been bashful in 
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10191 changing these interpretations. Why can't it change that 
10201 interpretation and say that the constitutional guarantee of 
1021 I the right of counsel applies also on appeals from state 
10221 convictions in the Federal courts? 
1023 Judge POWELL. The Supreme Court hasn't done that yet . I 
10241 say the Supreme Court has not done that yet. 
1025 Mr. CROCKETT. I know that. My question is why doesn't 
1026 your commission take it up with the Chief Justice and the 
10271 Supreme Court to change that ruling? 
10281 Judge POWELL. 
10291 the Chief Justice. 
Well, I will report your recommendation to 
I take it seriously, but the fact is 
10301 that the court, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
1031 I already ruled that the Constitution only requires counsel at 






That decision came down right in the middle 






it would come out. I think nobody on the committee thought 
the chief counsel wanted us to advise him on the 
constitutional representation, so we didn't try to do that. 
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you. 
Mr. KASTEHMEIER. The gentleman from Horth Carolina, Mr. 
1041 Coble. 
1042 Mr. COBLE. Thank you. I was delayed earlier and I 
10431 apologize for that, but it is good to have you all with us. 












I think, Mr. Powell, you just pretty well answered a 
question that I was plagued with when you indicated that, 
you all indicated that the Constitution does in fact 
guarantee the right to effective representation of counsel 
at the trial level, but let me ask you this, if I may: 
There seems to be some confusion, at least confusion in my 
mind, as to whether or not Federal habeas corpus review of 
state convictions is required by the Constitution. You all 
may have already touched upon this, but I would like the 
benefit of your collective views on that question. 
Judge POWELL. Habeas corpus is not required by the 
10551 Constitution except in certain special types of cases. 




Judge POWELL. Yes. I think the first Federal statute was 
1059 enacted in 1867 that authorized habeas corpus in Federal 
1060 courts. 
1061 Mr. PEARSON. I was just advising Justice Powell that the 
1062 1867 act was the first act that extended Federal habeas 
1063 corpus review to state prisoners, and that was of course the 
10641 act on which modern habeas corpus law has been built. 
10651 is statutory in origin, yes, sir. 
So it 
1066 Mr. COBLE. Okay. That is the only question I have. 
1067 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being 
1068 with us. 
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1069 Mr. KASTEMMEIER. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 
1070 Sangmeister? 
1071 Mr. SAKGMEISTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
10721 I just wanted to get straight as we are comparing each of 
10731 the proposals that are going to be before the Congress and 
10741 to get the Powell Committee's position on these issues very 
107 SI clear. Again I apologize for not being here right from the 
107 61 beg inning also. But what was the committee's recommendation 
1077 on the statute of limitations? There appears to be a 







Judge ROMEY. Six months. 
Mr. SAKGMEISTER. Okay. When was that statute of 
limitations supposed to run from? 
Judge POWELL. It would be tolled for as long as 
proceedings were pending on collateral review. 
Mr. PEARSOK. It starts with the appointment of counsel 
10851 and is tolled while the case is being actively litigated in 








Mr. SAMGMEISTER. What does that mean? 
Mr. PEARSOK. Filed and jurisdictions investigated or 
whatever court. 
Mr. SAMGMEISTER. And then the statute runs? 
Mr. PEARSON. The times runs from the order of 
10931 appointment. The purpose of the six-month rule is to create 
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13261 suppressed or whether there has been bribery, as you 
13271 suggest, so that discovery, the state habeas would be 
1328 available in a manner that is more generously than typically 
1329 is the case now in even some Federal habeas. 
1330 There is a way to work habeas at the front end to make the 
1331 litigation process operate so that factfinding is maximized. 
13321 But if you back-end it you wind up, I think, making the 
13331 factfinding process far less precise. 
1334 
1335 
Mr. BERMAK. That might be an interesting thing to pursue. 
Mr. PEARSOK. I am just trying to suggest an alternative 
13361 on that. 
1337 
1338 
Mr. KASTEKMEIER. Any other questions? 
If not, the committee would like to thank all three of 












for their appearances here this morning. We have a ways to 
go, I think, on this issue, as indicated by the questions, 
and we appreciate the efforts that you have collectively 
made individually and through your committee to achieve an 
improvement in the habeas corpus laws. 
Thank you gentlemen very much. 
Judge POWELL. I want to add that we appreciate very ~uch 
the opportunity to be here today and to have the chance to 
answer the questions, and to very good, intelligent 
questions that have been asked. It is a privilege to be 
here and to have the opportunity to meet with this very 
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1351 I important committee of the Congress. 
1352 11r. KASTEHMEIER. Well, it is a privilege to see you. 
